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In recent auctions for paging licenses, the Federal Communications Commission has granted
businesses owned by minorities and women substantial bidding credits. In this article, Professors Ayres
and Cramton analyze a particular auction and argue that the affirmative action bidding preferences, by
increasing competition among auction participants, increased the government’s revenue by $45 million.
Subsidizing the participation of new bidders can induce established bidders to bid more aggressively. The
authors conclude that this revenue-enhancing effect does not provide a sufficient constitutional
justification for affirmative action—but when such justification is independently present, affirmative
actions can cost the government much less than is currently thought.STANFORD LAW REVIEW, 48, 761-815, 1996 2
 INTRODUCTION
Congress first authorized the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) to auction licenses for slices of
the radio spectrum in 1993.
1 Since then, FCC auctions have raised nearly $9 billion.
2 AS part of these auctions,
Congress required the FCC to “ensure that . . . businesses owned by members of minority groups and women are
given the opportunity to participate in the provision of spectrum-based services, and, for such purposes, consider
the use of tax certificates, bidding preferences, and other procedures.”
3 Relying on this statutory mandate, the
FCC has at times granted substantial bidding preferences to firms controlled by women or minorities
(“designated bidders”).
This article focuses on the “regional narrowband” auction of thirty licenses for use in advanced paging
services (which might, for example, both transmit and receive messages).
4 Designated bidders in the regional
narrowband auction were allowed to pay for any of the licenses in installments over ten years at a favorable
interest rate
5 and, on ten of the thirty narrowband licenses, were granted a 40 percent bidding credit.
6 When both
preferences applied, the combined effect was that favored bidders had to pay the government only 50 percent of a
winning bid.
7
The FCC’s affirmative action has been criticized as a huge giveaway,
8 but this article will show that the
bidding preferences increased the government’s revenue by more than 12 percent—an increase in total revenues
of nearly $45 million. Although at first blush it seems that allowing designated bidders to pay fifty cents on the
dollar would necessarily reduce the government’s revenue, we will show that subsidizing designated bidders
created extra competition in the auctions and induced the established, unsubsidized firms to bid higher.
The unsubsidized firms bid more both because they had fewer licenses for which to compete (once the
substantial designated preferences effectively set aside ten of the thirty licenses) and because they had to compete
against the subsidized designated bidders crossing over to bid on non-set-aside licenses. The regional
narrowband auction is a vivid example of how subsidized bids by a minority- or female-controlled firm can
substantially increase the price that the government receives from a non-designated firm. Early in the auction, a
non-designated firm (PageMart), attempting to aggregate a national license by bidding for all five regional
licenses on a particular frequency block, had succeeded in outbidding all of its non-designated rivals by offering
to pay a total of $76 million.
9 However, a minority-controlled bidder, PCS Development, entered the fray, upping
the ante more than a dozen times and forcing PageMart ultimately to bid $93 million to win the licenses. The
additional competition from the minority-controlled firm increased the government’s revenue by $16 million.
10
The extra revenue the government earned from unsubsidized winning bidders, such as PageMart, more than
offset the subsidy to the designated bidders. Far from being a giveaway, affirmative action bidding preferences
induced competition that prevented established firms from buying the airwaves at substantial discounts.
* William K. Townsend Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
** Associate Professor, Department of Economics, University of Maryland. Steve Bainbridge, Jennifer Brown, Richard Craswell, Rob
Gertner, and seminar participants at the University of Arizona, the University of Chicago Law School, and the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology provided helpful comments. Franklin Parlamis provided excellent research assistance.
The authors are grateful to Rob Gertner and other participants at University of Chicago Law and Economics workshops for
discussions about advantages that the FCC has over private sellers.
1 47 U.S.C. § 309(j) (Supp. 1995). The FCC previously awarded licenses by lottery or by comparative hearing. See text
accompanying notes 172-173 infra.
2 See Peter C. Cramton, The PCS Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment 2 (Aug. 25, 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the Stanford Law Review). The auctioned frequencies were made available to personal communication services (“PCS”) providers. The FCC
auctioned 10 nationwide narrowband PCS licenses in July 1994, 30 regional narrowband licenses in October and November 1994, and 99
broadband licenses for Major Trading Areas (“MTAs”) from December through March 1995. Id. A second broadband auction for 493
licenses was scheduled for the spring of 1995 but was delayed by litigation over the FCC’s bidding preferences for small businesses,
women, and minorities. The auction ultimately was rescheduled for December 18, 1995. See note 128 infra.
3 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(4)(D) (Supp. 1995).
4 Because of their narrow bandwidth, however, these licenses are ill-suited for cellular or other real-time voice services: Cellular
services require broadband (30 MHz) transmission, up to 600 times wider than the spectrum assigned to narrowband (50 kHz), while
narrowband transmission is sufficient for delayed voice or data services. For example, downloading phone messages to a pager for later
playback only requires a narrowband license. See Cramton, supra note 2, at 2.
5 See notes 51-55 infra and accompanying text for a description of the installment subsidy.
6 For example, due to the bidding credit, a designated bidder who won a license with a bid of $10 million would only owe the
government $6 million. See text accompanying notes 44-50 infra for a detailed description of the specific frequency blocks to which these
bidding credits applied.
7 See notes 61-63 infra and accompanying text for a calculation of the combined subsidies. If a designated bidder prevailed on one of
the 20 licenses to which the 40% bidding credit did not apply, the government would receive an estimated 84% of the winning bid. Id.
8 See, e.g., Jonathan Rauch, Color TV. THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 19, 1994, at 9.
9 Even though no other firm raised PageMart’s bids for several rounds, the simultaneous auction was designed to remain open until
there were no new bids on any of the 30 licenses. See notes 45-46 infra and accompanying text. The final results of the auction appear in
Table 3 infra.
10 See text accompanying note 83 infra.AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AT THE FCC 3
Our positive thesis is that affirmative action can enhance bidding competition and thereby increase revenue.
Of course, this can only occur where competition among unsubsidized bidders would otherwise fail—for
example, if there were a shortage of serious unsubsidized bidders or if bidders were to collude, explicitly or
tacitly. Moreover, affirmative action’s capacity to enhance competition is not limited to situations where the
government is a seller. Indeed, the government buys far more than it sells, and affirmative action bidding
preferences may reduce the cost of government acquisitions for the same reasons. When competing against
subsidized bidders for government contracts, unsubsidized suppliers may lower their bids to increase their
chances of winning the new contract.
More broadly, this analysis reveals a potential profit motive for private affirmative action. Just as competition
among unsubsidized bidders may not maximize the auction organizer’s revenue, competition among workers in
some labor markets may not maximize employer profits. If competition among the strongest job applicants is not
sufficient for the employer to extract all the gains of trade from the employment relationship, then employers may
have an incentive to subsidize weaker candidates, thereby inducing stronger applicants to work harder or for a
lower wage.
11
While we show that affirmative action at the FCC’s regional narrowband auction decreased the budget deficit
(and might plausibly be used to reduce government procurement costs or to increase private profits), we do not
argue that this revenue-enhancing effect is normatively sufficient to justify race- or gender-conscious
decisionmaking. Indeed, using affirmative action to reduce the budget deficit would not satisfy either prong of
Adarand’s strict scrutiny analysis:
12 Raising additional revenues is not a “compelling governmental purpose,” and
race-conscious means are not “narrowly tailored” to further that goal—race-neutral subsidies of small bidders
would also likely be able to enhance the government fisc.
The revenue-enhancing effect, however, shows that affirmative action may cost the government less than
previously thought. Demonstrating that such measures need not drain the treasury might be imperative for
garnering legislative support. Thus, even if the revenue effect is not constitutionally sufficient to justify
affirmative action, it may establish a necessary condition for politically justifying it.
The relevance of showing that affirmative action subsidies do not burden the treasury is apparent in current
debates surrounding the various California ballot initiatives to end state-sponsored affirmative action.
13
Proponents of these initiatives trumpet the nonpartisan estimates of the legislative analyst office that the state
could save tens of millions of dollars annually by eliminating affirmative action.
14 These estimates assume that
affirmative action increases the state’s procurement costs whenever the state rejects a low bid to contract with
historically disadvantaged firms.
15 But the take-home lesson of this article is that affirmative action may not cost
nearly as much as such crude estimates. In the procurement context, there is anecdotal evidence that affirmative
action bidding subsidies have destabilized tacit collusion among unsubsidized bidders and have thereby reduced
the average cost of procurement. The all-too-familiar story of a few government suppliers entering inflated,
collusive bids can be rewritten by affirmative action initiatives that subsidize new entrants and thereby spur more
competition. An unidentified source at the California Department of Transportation reports that affirmative action
has forced the price of winning construction bids to approach independent estimates of construction costs.
16
But in emphasizing the normative relevance of enhanced bidding competition, it is also important to
recognize that increased government revenue (or decreased government cost) does not imply that affirmative
action subsidies promote efficiency. Indeed, the beneficial impact on the government’s revenue from bidding
subsidies will often come at a cost of some economic inefficiency—in equilibrium some contracts will be
awarded to lower-valuing buyers (or higher-cost producers). While enhancing market competition usually
increases efficiency, enhancing bidding competition through affirmative action subsidies simply allows the
government to capture more of the gains of trade, usually at the cost of some inefficiency.
17 These inefficiencies,
11 The troubling aspects of describing beneficiaries of affirmative action as “weaker candidates” are discussed infra at note 20.
12 Adarand Constr. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995) (holding that federal government affirmative action measures must pass strict
scrutiny).
13 Several constitutional amendments concerning affirmative action have been filed with the California Attorney General for potential
inclusion on the 1996 ballot. See, e.g., Cad Ingram, Affirmative Action Measures Threaten to Confuse Voters, L.A. TIMES, July 3, 1995, at
A3. Perhaps the most prominent of these is the California Civil Rights Initiative. See The Great Debate Over Affirmative Action S.F.
CHRON., Jan. 19, 1995, at A21.
14 William F. Buckley, California’s New Fight Over Civil Rights, THE FRESNO BEE, Jan. 12, 1994, at B7.
15 For example, 16% of prime contractors responding to a 1986 survey by the California Construction Industry Research Board
reported submitting the lowest bid on a federal project within the previous year but losing that project because of failure to meet affirmative
action goals. These contractors reported that the winning bids were on average 5.3% higher than their own low bids. Charles Oliver, Making
California Colorblind?, INVESTOR’S BUS DAILY, Mar. 21, 1995, at Al, A2.
16 Confidential conversation with Ayres (1995).
17 To the extent that the subsidies increase revenue, the cost due to an inefficient assignment may be more than offset by the
efficiency gain from raising revenues in a nondistortionary way. Governments need revenue, which is normally raised by taxation. Taxation,
however, is distortionary. Economists estimate that the welfare loss from increasing taxes is in the range of 17 to 56 cents per dollar of extraSTANFORD LAW REVIEW, 48, 761-815, 1996 4
however, may be short-term if affirmative action promotes new entry that stimulates subsequent, unsubsidized
market competition. Moreover, there may be no efficiency loss if lower designated bids simply reflect inability to
pay (possibly caused by discrimination in credit markets) rather than less prospective ability to supply paging
services.
18
This paper is divided into four parts. Part I analyzes a series of game theoretic examples to show how bidding
preferences could enhance government revenue. In Part II, we illustrate how this occurred in the FCC’s regional
narrowband auction. Part III identifies a limited set of other contexts where affirmative action might be
profitable. Finally, Part IV explores the normative and legal implications of affirmative action’s revenue-
enhancing effect.
I. THEORY
An auction with few bidders can generate selling prices substantially below the highest bidders’ valuations.
Foreclosure sales, for example, are notorious for this type of competitive failure: If only two bidders show up to
bid on a single piece of property, the bidder with the higher valuation will only have to outbid her counterpart—
even if the lower bid is only a fraction of the property’s true market value.
19
Giving bidding preferences to weak bidders
20 can increase auction revenues by inducing stronger bidders to
bid more aggressively. Bidding preferences can enhance both “intragroup” and “intergroup” auction competition:
Bidding preferences that reduce the quantity available to strong bidders may cause them to bid more aggressively
among themselves (intragroup competition); subsidizing weak bidders may allow them to challenge strong
bidders (intergroup competition).
21
Giving bidding preferences to relatively weak bidders, however, is likely to enhance expected revenue only if:
(1) there is insufficient competition among the highest valuing bidders, and (2) the seller is able to identify stable
classes of bidders who are likely to have relatively low valuations. The first of these conditions is likely to hold
where there are few bidders relative to the number of goods auctioned. The auction price is determined by the
value of the last bidder to drop out, and the reservation price of this last bidder is likely to be lower when fewer
bidders participate in an auction. Conversely, if there are a large number of relatively high-value bidders active in
an auction, then competition among these bidders by itself will allow the seller to extract most of the gains from
trade, obviating the need for bidding subsidies.
22
                                                                                                                                                                                    
revenue raised. See Charles L. Ballard, John B. Shoven & John Whalley, General Equilibrium Computations of the Marginal Welfare Costs
of Taxes in the United States, AM. ECON. REV., Mar. 1985, at 128. Hence, even if the subsidies causes substantial inefficiencies in
assignments, the welfare loss may be more than offset by a reduction in distortionary taxes. Governments should care about the revenue
consequences of the auction design. See MICHAEL H. ROTHKOPF & RONALD M. HARSTAD, RECONCILING EFFICIENCY ARGUMENTS IN
TAXATION AND PUBLIC SECTOR RESOURCE LEASING 1 (RUTCOR Research Report No. 66-90, 1990).
18 A final normative implication of using affirmative action to enhance competition concerns the legality of affirmative action by
private employers under Title VII. That some private employers may institute affirmative action programs solely to increase profits may
cause courts to scrutinize private affirmative action more closely, in order to distinguish plans that seek to remedy past discrimination from
those motivated solely by a desire to increase profits. See notes 165-168 infra and accompanying text.
19 Similarly, in bankruptcy, secured creditors are interested in generating enough income to cover their debt, rather than in
maximizing the debtor’s residual value. In liquidating or reorganizing debtors, creditors have no incentive to sell corporate assets for more
than the value of their claims. See Philippe Aghion, Oliver Hart & John Moore, The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
523, 525-28 (1992) (discussing obstacles to attainment of full market value for assets auctioned pursuant to a bankruptcy proceeding).
20 A “weak” bidder is a bidder who has a lower expected reservation price. The highest amount that a bidder is willing or able to pay
is that bidder’s “reservation price.’ See Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Ian Ayres, Economic Rationales for Mediation, 80 VA. L. REV. 323, 331
n.26 (1994). In this article, we assume that a bidder knows its own reservation price, but that sellers and other bidders are imperfectly
informed and can only form expectations of the bidder’s reservation price.
In the regional narrowband auction, affirmative action subsidies were premised on the FCC’s belief that firms controlled by women
and minorities had a lower ability to pay for licenses, in part because of discrimination in credit markets. Implementation of Section 309(j)
of the Communications Act—Competitive Bidding, 9 F.C.C.R. 2941, 2968-71 (1994) (Third Report and Order, PP Docket No. 93-253)
[hereinafter Third Report & Order].
Our description of designated firms as relatively weak bidders is intended only to connote that these bidders may have lower expected
reservation prices. Making this assumption without sufficient empirical support risks a disabling type of stereotype. As Justice Clarence
Thomas recently wrote: “It never ceases to amaze me that the courts are so willing to assume that anything that is predominantly black must
be inferior.” Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2061 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). However, the FCC’s difficulties in promoting
diverse participation and the results of the narrowband auction themselves support the inference that designated bidders had lower
reservation prices. See Table 3 infra.
21 By granting designated bidders a 50% subsidy on two frequency blocks, the FCC effectively excluded non-designated bids, thereby
forcing non-designated bidders to bid more aggressively on the remaining blocks (intragroup competition). See notes 49-50 infra and
accompanying text. In addition, the FCC fostered intergroup competition by giving designated bidders a 16% subsidy on the four other
frequency blocks. Id.
22 R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, Auctions and Bidding, 25 J. ECON. LITERATURE 699, 703 (1987). Formally, if the valuations
for a group of high valuers is drawn from the same probability distribution, then the expected auction price will asymptote to the highest
bidder valuation as the size of the group becomes arbitrarily large. Id. at 711.AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AT THE FCC 5
But even having as many as four excess bidders may not be sufficient to extract all of the gains of trade. For
example, assume that four widgets are being auctioned to a group of bidders who have reservation prices
uniformly distributed between $0 and $100 (and that the seller’s reservation price is $0). The percentage of the
gains of trade that the seller captures crucially depends on the number of bidders in excess of the number of items
being sold. As shown in Table 1, even with eight bidders the seller will only capture 61.5 percent of the expected
gains from trade. Our analysis shows that subsidizing weak bidders can increase the seller’s yield by inducing the
highest valuers to bid more.
TABLE 1. EFFECT OF EXCESS BIDDERS ON SELLER’S EXPECTED PROFITS
23
Number of Bidders
Expected Percentage of Gains










The second condition for profitably subsidizing weak bidders does not require that sellers know either the
bidders’ reservation prices or their expected reservation prices. But sellers must be able to estimate the expected
difference between the reservation prices of at least two stable groups of bidders in order to identify the weaker
group and to calculate the size of the subsidy that might enhance revenue.
24 Sellers would want to distinguish
between expected high and low value bidders because subsidizing high-value bidders would normally reduce the
expected auction revenues.
25
The narrowband PCS auctions likely satisfied both conditions: an insufficient number of higher value bidders
and a readily identifiable class of weak bidders. Because the demand for, and the supply of, these advanced
paging services are unproven, capital markets shied away from financing companies that did not already have
significant prior industry experience. This capital market constraint by itself could explain why competition
among nonpreferred firms would be insufficient to drive bidding toward the highest bidders’ reservation prices.
23 Because the seller’s reservation price is $0, the expected gain from trade is simply the expected high value among a certain number
of bidders. Statisticians call this value the first-order statistic. The expected price in an auction of four items is the fifth-order statistic. To
derive Table 1, we simply calculated the first- through fifth-order statistics for different numbers of bidders (which are well-defined for the
uniform distribution); we then divided the fifth-order statistic by the sum of the first- through fourth-order statistics and multiplied the result
by the number of items being auctioned, which yielded the expected percentage of gains from trade accruing to the seller (as auction
revenue). For example, with n = 9 bidders, the expected value of the first- to fifth-order statistics are 0.9, 0.8, 0.7, 0.6, and 0.5. Revenue is
equal to 4 x (0.5) = 2 and the expected gains from trade are 0.9 + 0.8 + 0.7 + 0.6 = 3, so the seller’s share is 2/3 = 66.7%. For a technical
discussion of expected bids, see Jeremy Bulow & John Roberts, The Simple Economics of Optimal Auctions, 97 J. POL. EECON. 1060, 1086-
89 (1989).
24 Game-theorists use the term “private valuation” auction to refer to auctions in which each bidder knows her private valuation, but
the seller and the other bidders know only the probability distribution from which this valuation is drawn. Private valuation models are
usually contrasted with “common valuation” models, in which all bidders have a single, common value for the good being auctioned, but
have imperfect information about what this value will turn out to be. See Peter Cramton & Alan Schwartz, Using Auction Theory to Inform
Takeover Regulation, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 27, 28-29 (1991) (distinguishing between common value and independent private value
auctions). While the narrowband auctions certainly have some aspects of a common valuation game, bidders’ idiosyncratic entrepreneurial
abilities inject a private valuation component which can give rise to a revenue-enhancing effect—that is, bidders “derive different surplus
from winning.” Id. at 29 n.4.
25 Giving bidding subsidies to a bidder who is likely to have a high valuation would reduce auction competition and lead to lower
expected revenues because such a subsidy would entrench the strong/subsidized bidder and reduce the amount that this bidder would likely
have to pay to win the auction.
If the seller believes that bidders’ demand for multiple items to be auctioned is sufficiently inelastic, then the seller may want to set
aside one or more of the items even if she cannot distinguish between higher- and lower-valuing bidders. Indeed, increased revenue from
quantity reduction on the auctions without set-asides might be greater than the reduced revenue that the seller would expect to receive from
the set-aside license. Where the seller cannot identify relatively weak bidders—from the seller’s perspective all bidders are symmetric ex
ante—arbitrary preferences will not maximize expected revenue. Under these conditions, the revenue-maximizing multi-object auction is
symmetric. See generally Eric Maskin & John Riley, Optimal Multi-unit Auctions, in THE ECONOMICS OF MISSING MARKET, INFORMATION,
AND GAMES 312 (Frank Hahn ea., 1989).STANFORD LAW REVIEW, 48, 761-815, 1996 6
Since designated bidders are disproportionally underrepresented in communications technology markets, the
government could reasonably expect that these capital market constraints would bind designated bidders all the
more. Thus, the FCC could reasonably conclude that designated bidders would have lower reservation prices.
Nonetheless, the government’s informational problem was far from trivial: While the government could
reasonably expect that designated bidders would be weaker, it is not clear that they knew how much weaker. And
knowing the magnitude of the difference in reservation prices between strong and weak bidders is critical to
calculating the size of the subsidy necessary to increase expected revenue.
To underscore how difficult it is to meet these two conditions, the reader should keep in mind that few real
world sellers find it worthwhile to subsidize weak bidders to increase their expected revenue.
26 For example, one
would think in the context of art auctions that subsidizing museums (which are often thought to have constrained
budgets) might be a way to induce private collectors to bid more. But auction houses normally do not subsidize
weak bidders. The FCC, however, has several advantages over private sellers.
27 Most importantly, the FCC can
prohibit subsidized bidders from reselling to unsubsidized firms.
28 The resale possibility greatly exacerbates the
private seller’s informational problem: It is much more difficult to identify a class of weak bidders because a
weak bidder may in effect just be purchasing on behalf of the stronger, unsubsidized bidders. By prohibiting (or
I.Drestricting) resale of the designated bidders’ licenses to non-designated firms, the government by fiat can
eliminate the unraveling effects of resales. The FCC’s decision to sell more licenses than a profit-maximizing
monopolist also increased the chance that affirmative action would raise revenue: If the FCC were only interested
in maximizing the auction revenue, it would have only auctioned one license per region because firms bidding for
the right to have a monopoly would pay much more than firms bidding for the right to compete with many other
firms. While there may have been enough established firms to create a competitive auction for single licenses, the
FCC’s decision to sell six narrowband licenses in each of the five regions, in addition to the ten nationwide,
created the need to bring more bidders to the table to enhance auction competition.
To illustrate how affirmative action can enhance bidding competition, we begin with a series of examples
showing how a particular set-aside or bidding credit increases expected revenue, without addressing whether the
seller has adequate information to choose the right subsidy. In Part I.D we will then explain how an imperfectly
informed seller could calculate revenue-enhancing subsidies.
In the initial series of examples, we assume that four firms are bidding to purchase two licenses and that each
bidder is only interested in purchasing a single license.
29 The four bidders have different reservation prices: The
two strong bidders (Strong1 and Strong2) are willing to bid up to $110 and $90 respectively, and the two weak
bidders (Weak1 and Weak2) are willing to bid up to $60 and $40 respectively.
Using a traditional English (or open ascending) auction, in which the price rises until a single buyer remains,
the government should expect to earn slightly more than $120. The two strong bidders only need to slightly
outbid the $60 weak bidder in order to win licenses. Even though the strong bidders would have been willing, if
needed, to bid more, they have no reason to compete against each other; the supply of licenses at this price is
sufficient to satisfy their own demand. Using this auction as a benchmark, we will now consider a series of
examples in which bidding credits and set-asides generate more than $120 in government revenue by inducing
the strong bidders to bid more aggressively.
A. Set-Asides Can Enhance Intragroup Competition Among Strong Bidders
Sellers can induce more competition among strong bidders, and therefore increase auction revenues, by
reducing the number of items available to the strong bidders. The quantity available for strong bidders can be
reduced simply by setting aside one of the licenses to be auctioned only among the weak bidders. The set-aside
license will be auctioned for just over $40 as Weak1 will bid slightly more than Weak2’s reservation price. After
the set-aside, there are no longer enough licenses to satisfy strong-bidder demand, and these bidders accordingly
will bid more aggressively for the remaining license. This remaining license will be auctioned for slightly more
than $90 as Strong1 will bid slightly more than Strong2’s reservation price—and $30 more than it would bid
26 Sellers often do establish minimum auction bids (often referred to as the “reserve price”, above their own value, which has the
effect of subsidizing themselves as a particular type of weak bidder. See note 35 infra and accompanying text (discussing effect of seller
reserve prices). We revisit this informational problem when we assess the analogous use of affirmative action by private employers. See
notes 142-147 infra and accompanying text.
27 The Robinson-Patman Act’s (rarely enforced) prohibition against price discrimination may deter sellers from subsidizing weak
bidders — especially as here when bidders subsequently compete with each other. Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1994).
28 The FCC rules do not specifically address the leasing of licenses from a designated bidder to a non-designated bidder.  See Third
Report and Order, supra note 20, at ¶¶ 66-89. This failure may increase the possibility of a sham designated bidder. However, if the lease
was structured in a way that the designated bidder effectively lost control of the license, then presumably the FCC would prohibit the
arrangement, since it would amount to a change in control.
29 We assume that a single license will give the bidder sufficient capacity to serve al] of the demand in me geographic area.
Alternatively, we might have assumed that the FCC prohibits any firm from owning more than one license in a geographic area.AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AT THE FCC 7
absent the set-aside. Setting aside one license thus raises the government’s expected revenue to slightly more than
$130, an increase of $10. Despite increasing government revenue, the set-aside also reduces efficiency—one of
the licenses ends up in the hands of a $60 valuer instead of a $90 valuer.
30
B. Bidding Credits Can Create Effective Set-Asides
Like explicit set-asides, bidding credits can enhance government revenues by effectively reducing the
quantity available to strong bidders. Consider a bidding credit that allows weak bidders to pay only 50 percent of
their winning bids. Because of this 50 percent bidding credit, Weak, would be willing to bid up to $120.
Therefore, Strong, and Weak, would each win a license by bidding slightly more than $90 (Strong2’s reservation
price).
31 The government revenue from this auction would be approximately $135: Strong1 would pay slightly
more than $90 and Weak, would pay 50 percent of its bid, or slightly more than $45. The bidding credit reduces
the quantity available to the strong bidders. Because neither strong bidder will bid up to Weak1’s $120 subsidized
reservation price, they will compete with each other for one license, driving its price to $90. The bidding credit
generates more government revenue than the set-aside because Weak1 must compete with Strong2 rather than
Weak2 to win a license. Like the set-aside, the 50 percent bidding credit induces inefficiency by allowing Weak,
to win a license instead of Strong2; nonetheless, the government realizes more revenue than it would either with a
traditional English auction or with a set-aside.
C. Bidding Credits Can Create Intergroup Competition
Properly calibrated bidding credits can simultaneously cause strong bidders to bid more aggressively and
avoid inefficiency. With a 25 percent credit (rather than the previous 50 percent), Weak1 will bid $80,
32 and the
strong bidders will each win a license by bidding slightly more than this amount. The total auction revenue will
be slightly more than $160. The 25 percent bidding credit induces intergroup competition as weak bidders raise
the amounts that strong bidders must pay to win licenses. Absent any bidding preference, the strong bidders pay
only $60 per license, but the bidding credit forces each strong bidder to increase its bid $20.
33
D. Affirmative Action Can Increase Expected Revenue When the Government Is Imperfectly Informed About
Bidder Valuations
The foregoing examples make clear that bidding preferences can enhance government revenues when the
seller knows the reservation prices of the individual bidders. Imputing this knowledge to sellers, however, is
unreasonable, not only because they seldom have this information, but also because if they did, knowledgeable
sellers would maximize revenue by setting firm-specific reservation prices. For example, if the government knew
the reservation prices of the strong firms, it would simply make Strong1 and Strong2 take-it-or-leaveit offers of
slightly less than $110 and $90 respectively.
In this section, we show how bidding preferences can enhance revenue even when sellers are imperfectly
informed about bidder valuations. When sellers do not know bidders’ exact valuations, subsidizing weak bidders
may allow a low-value bidder to buy a license for a low price, resulting in reduced revenue and lost efficiency.
Nonetheless, the expected benefits of more aggressive bidding by strong bidders may outweigh this cost:
There is a trade-off. By favoring the low-valuation type of bidders, the seller raises the probability of awarding the
item to someone other than the bidder who values it the most and receiving a relatively low payment. The benefit
from this policy, however, is that the favoritism forces the bidders from the high valuation class to bid higher than
they otherwise would, driving up the price on average.
34
The intuition behind this result explains why sellers in an auction sometimes set a reserve price above their actual
valuations. With an inflated reserve price, the sellers are in effect subsidizing themselves as bidders. Although an
inflated reservation price can induce more aggressive bidding by unsubsidized bidders, sellers also increase the
risk that they will sell the item back to themselves.
35
30 The set-aside correspondingly reduces the  profits or, in game-theoretic terms, payoffs that the strong bidders would earn in the
absence of a set-aside. The set-aside reduces the payoffs to the strong bidders by $60. Strong1,s payoff decreases from $50 to $20: Without
the set-aside. Strong1 pays $60 for a license it values at $110 ($ 110 – $60 = $50) whereas with the set-aside Strong1 must pay $90 ($ 110 –
$90 = $20)
31 Weak2 would not bid more than $80, because winning at more than this price would force it to pay more than its reservation price
of $40.
32 Bidding more than $80 would force Weak1 to pay more than its $60 reservation price if it won a license ($80 x (1 – 0.25) = $60).
33 Giving the weak bidders a 33.33% bidding credit would further increase the government’s revenue—Weak1 would force strong
bidders to bid at least $90 to win the auction. Weak1 would bid $90 because $90 x (1 – 0.3333) = $60.
34 McAfee & McMillan, supra note 22, at 715.
35 Id at 715 n.l9 (“The optimal reserve-price policy . . . can . . . be seen to be a special instance of this optimal discriminatory policy,
with the seller discriminating between himself, as an implicit bidder, and the actual bidders.”); see also Robert C. Marshall, Michael J.
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To see the effect of affirmative action in a specific imperfect information example, consider a seller
auctioning a single good between two potential risk-neutral buyers.
36 Assume that the reservation price for the
first potential buyer (Strong) is drawn from a uniform probability distribution that is equally likely to take on any
value between $100 and $300 million, and that the reservation price for the second potential buyer (Weak) is
drawn from a distribution that is equally likely to take on any value between $0 and $100 million. Also assume
that the seller’s reservation price is known to be $0.
With only these two bidders in a traditional English auction with open ascending bids, Strong will always
win, paying an expected price of $50 million (the price where on average Weak would stop bidding). In this
simple auction, the weak bidder offers little competition to the strong one. As suggested above, the seller can
encourage more aggressive bidding by entering a bid above its own $0 valuation: Setting a reserve price of $150
million increases the seller’s expected revenue from $50 million to $112.5 million.
37
A revenue-maximizing seller can still do better. The seller can induce even more bidding competition by
subsidizing both itself and the weak bidder. As originally derived by Myerson,
38 the optimal English auction
should take the following form:
The seller should set a $150 million reserve price, i.e. the minimum acceptablebid, and give Weak a $100 million
bidding credit.
39
With the bidding credit, Weak competes more vigorously with Strong because, for example, if Weak’s value
was $60 million, it would be willing to bid up to $160 million. Even though it is common knowledge that Weak’s
valuation is lower than Strong’s valuation, the seller can use Weak to extract higher bids from Strong. In this
revenue-maximizing auction, the seller’s expected revenue rises to $120.83 million; the bidding preference for
the weak bidder raises the expected revenue by more than $8.3 million.
40
These enhanced expected revenues come at the expense of efficiency: As before, subsidizing weaker bidders
creates the possibility that lower valuing owners will purchase the good. For example, if Weak’s value is $80
                                                                                                                                                                                    
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 8 (1991) (“The . . . reserve . . . force[s] vendors to bid more aggressively to ensure that they exceed the reserve. When a
reserve has been optimally set, the potential ex post inefficiency from making no award is more than offset, in an expected sense, by the
higher surplus generated from more aggressive bidding.”).
36 This example is adapted from one found in Bulow & Roberts, supra note 23, at 1061. Uniform distribution examples also can be
found in Roger B. Myerson, Optimal Auction Design, 6 MATH. OPERATIONS RES. 58, 59 (1981).
37 Three-quarters of the time, Strong will bid $150 million, the other quarter of the time, Strong will bid between $100 and $150
million, and the seller will retain the good (($150 x 0.75) + ($0 x 0.25) = $112.5). Setting a reserve pace of $100 million would increase the
seller’s expected revenue from $50 to $100 million, because, under our assumptions, Strong will always be willing to bid at least $100
million. But our example shows that setting a reserve price above both the seller’s and Strong’s minimum value can be a revenue
maximizing strategy. See Bulow & Roberts, supra note 23, at 1064-69.
38 See Myerson, supra note 36. Myerson employed mechanism design techniques to derive the optimal auction design. He assumes there are
n bidders and a single good being sold. (The analysis applies to multiple goods, so long as their values are not interdependent.). Bidder i’s
valuation vi is known only to i, but it is commonly known among bidders that each v; is drawn independency from the distribution Fj with
density fi.
In the symmetric case, where each valuation is drawn from the same distribution (Fi = Fj = F), the seller optimally treats the bidders
the same, and the good goes to the bidder with the highest valuation vi. Moreover, any of the standard auction forms (with the optimal
reserve) maximizes revenue for the seller. Myerson shows that the seller optimally awards the good to the bidder with the highest value of
J(vi) = vi - [1 - F(vi)]/f(vi) (assuming J is increasing in vi; and J is positive for the bidder with the highest valuation vi). See Id. at 66. The
second term, [1 - F(vi)]/f(vi), represents the information rent going to the winning bidder. This is equal to the expected difference between
the highest and second highest valuation.
In the asymmetric case, (Fi „ Fj), the seller optimally treats bidders differently. In this case, the seller does not always award the good
to the bidder with the highest valuation vi. Rather, the seller manipulates bidders’ incentives to increase competition among the bidders at
the auction. More precisely, the seller optimally awards the good to the bidder with the highest value of Ji(vi) = vi - [1 – F(vi)]/f(vi).
For example, if bidder i’s valuation is uniformly distributed between ai end bi, then Fi(vi) = (vi – ai)/ (bi – ai), fi(vi) = 1/( bi – ai), and
Ji(vi) = 2vi – bi. See Bulow & Roberts, supra note 23, at 1067. Suppose there are two bidders, Weak and Strong. Weak’s maximum
valuation, bw, is less than Strong’s maximum valuation, bs According to the rule above, the seller awards the good to Weak if 2vw – bw > 2vs
– bs, or vw > vs – (bs – bw)/2. Since bs > bw, Weak is favored in the optimal auction because Weak will sometimes win even when Strong
values the good more than Weak. In an ascending-bid auction, the seller implements this preference by giving similarly situated weak
bidders a bidding credit of (bs – bw)/2.
39 For explanation of this form of auction, see Bulow & Roberts, supra note 23 at 1069-77.
40 In equilibrium, the payoffs for Strong and Weak average $47.92 million and $4.17 million, respectively. The bidding preference,
however, induces inefficiency, because the weaker bidder wins the auction 3/16th of the time (and because the reserve pace prevents trade
1/8th of the time) Without the bidding preference or the reserve pace, Strong always wins and produces average “gains of trade” equaling
$200 million. Without the bidding preference but with the $150 million reserve pace, the seller inefficiently retains the good 25% of the
time—the total gains of trade therefore fall to $168.75 million ((300 + 150) / (2 x 0.75) + (0 x 0.25)). With both the $100 million bidding
preference and the $150 million reserve pace, the average “gains of trade” are $172.92 million (gain from optimal auction = 120.83 + 4.17 +
47.92 = $172.92)—which represents 13.54% inefficiency; the gain from an English auction would be $200 (50 + 0 + 150). See Bulow &
Roberts, supra note 23, at 1064-69 (discussing construction of an optimal auction). Bidding credits improve efficiency, holding the $150
million reserve pace constant, because the auction without the bidding credit completely ignores Weak and instead promotes competition by
subsidizing an even weaker bidder (the seller). The bidding credit allows the seller to use Weak to induce Strong to pay more. Trade occurs
7/8th of the time with the bidding credit, rather than just 6/8th of the time with the optimal reserve pace alone.AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AT THE FCC 9
million and Strong’s value is $170 million, then Weak would win the auction with a bid slightly above $170
million (and would pay only slightly above $70 million).
In general, the size of the bidding that will maximize revenue depends on the seller’s beliefs about the strong
and weak bidders’ relative valuations.
41 But this example has shown that a seller cannot do as well by merely
establishing minimum acceptable bids. When a seller has imperfect information about the buyers’ values,
subsidizing weak bidders may be necessary to maximize the seller’s expected returns.
E. Affirmative Action Can Destabilize Tacit Collusion
Fostering additional competition by subsidizing weaker bidders may also destabilize incentives for bidders to
collude tacitly. The incentives for tacit collusion are particularly acute where multiple products are being
auctioned: Rational bidders consider how bidding on one product may affect the price that they will pay on other
products—and might accordingly bid less.
To see how tacit collusion occurs, imagine that Sprint and AT&T are competing for two licenses: one in
Philadelphia and the other in Boston. To keep things simple, assume that it is commonly known that AT&T has a
reservation price of $10 million for each license and that Sprint’s reservation prices for the Philadelphia and
Boston licenses are $8 and $7 million respectively. Also assume that without affirmative action, no other bidder
would bid more than $2 million for either license.
How much money should the government expect to make from the simultaneous auctioning of these two
licenses? If both AT&T and Sprint ignore the impact of their bidding on the other license’s price, then the
government should earn slightly more than $15 million—as AT&T would outbid Sprint to win both licenses.
Rational bidders, however, will consider how bidding on one license may affect the other license’s price.
Specifically, AT&T may decide to bid only slightly above $2 million for the Boston license and to refrain from
bidding for the Philadelphia license. AT&T’s strategy would be an implicit offer to Sprint to divide the
markets: “We’ll let you buy the Philadelphia license cheaply, if you let us buy the Boston license cheaply.”
Coupled with this implicit invitation comes an implicit threat: If Sprint bids to increase the price of the Boston
license, AT&T will retaliate by bidding up the Philadelphia license’s price.
42
If Sprint accepts this implicit offer, AT&T and Sprint will each purchase a license for slightly more than $2
million. Both parties have an incentive to abide by this market-division agreement, because they earn higher
profits by coordinating their bidding behavior rather than by competing. AT&T does better by buying one license
for a low price than by buying two licenses for relatively high prices. Without the tacit market division, AT&T’s
expected profit would be $5 million (because it would pay $15 million for licenses that it valued at $20 million).
Dividing the market, however, increases AT&T’s payoff to $8 million (because it buys a $10 million license for
only $2 million).
43
Affirmative action can destabilize this collusive equilibrium. If the government gave weak bidders a 67
percent bidding credit, weak bidders (with $2 million reservation prices) would be willing to bid up to
approximately $6 million. Facing subsidized competitors, AT&T would no longer want to divide the market.
Tacit collusion would now allow AT&T to realize only a $4 million payoff on the Boston license, while AT&T
would earn $5 million by bidding aggressively on both licenses (buying one $10 million license for $8 million
and the other for $7 million).
The moral of these reductive economic fables is quite simple: Subsidizing weak bidders can enhance a
seller’s auction revenue by forcing strong bidders to bid more aggressively. Bidding subsidies for weak bidders—
far from being “giveaways”—can prevent giveaways by forcing relatively strong bidders to bid closer to their
reservation prices. Nonetheless, the subsidies often cause inefficiency whenever the good is actually sold to a
weak bidder. But this is a cost that revenue-maximizing sellers are willing to bear. Such sellers might consider
the windfall that occasionally accrues to a weak bidder as a fee for enhancing the auction competition.
II. EMPIRICISM
41 Whenever the valuation distributions have the same shape but different means, sellers seeking to maximize expected auction
revenue will subsidize bidders with the lower mean. See McAfee & McMillan, supra note 22, at 715.
42 Sprint, rather than AT&T, might just as easily have made the tacit “offer’ to collude by initially refraining from bidding on the
Boston license. Tacit “offers” and “acceptances” were especially easy to implement in the regional narrowband auction because the licenses
for different regions were auctioned simultaneously, allowing any colluder to monitor its counterparty’s compliance with the “agreement.”
Collusive behavior is more difficult to coordinate during sequential auctioning of individual licenses, because there is a stronger incentive
for the early auction winner to breach the agreement and to bid in the subsequent auctions.
43 The market division also clearly helps Sprint because it would win neither license without the tacit restraint but earns $6 million by
cooperating with AT&T (as it pays $2 million for a license that it values at $8 million). Tacit collusion therefore reduces the government’s
revenue by $11 million (from $15 to $4 million) and creates inefficiency by allowing Sprint to win the Philadelphia license even though its
valuation of that license is lower than AT&T’s.STANFORD LAW REVIEW, 48, 761-815, 1996 10
A. Describing the Licenses and the Auction Rules
The FCC offered thirty licenses for sale in the regional narrowband auction: Six narrowbands of the radio
spectrum (Frequency Blocks 1 through 6) were offered in each of five regions (Northeast, South, Midwest,
Central, and West). Thus, each of the thirty licenses authorized transmission on a particular frequency block in a
particular region.
Each frequency block was divided so that licensee pagers could both send and receive information. Two of
the six licenses in every region (Blocks 1 and 2) were allocated 50 kHz for both incoming and outgoing messages
(“50/50 blocks”), while the remaining four licenses (Blocks 3, 4, 5, and 6) were allocated 50 kHz for incoming
transmissions and 12.5 kHz for outgoing transmissions (“50/12 blocks”).
44
The thirty licenses were sold in a simultaneous multiple-round auction, which is similar to a traditional
English auction except that, rather than selling each license in sequence, a group of licenses is auctioned
simultaneously.
45 In any round a bidder may bid on any of the licenses being offered, and the auction does not
close until bidding has ceased on all licenses—that is, until a round goes by in which no one raises the prevailing
bid on any license.
46
The FCC changed the rules governing designated subsidies just before the regional auction. In the July 1994
auction for nationwide licenses, the FCC had granted designated bidders 25 percent bidding credits on three of
the ten narrowband licenses.
47 The 25 percent credit, however, proved to be insufficient to allow any designated
bidders to win a license—and most designated bidders dropped out after the first round of bidding.
48 The FCC
responded by increasing the bidding credit in the regional narrowband auction from 25 percent to 40 percent.
49
The bidding credits could be used on ten of the thirty regional licenses: the five Frequency Block 2 licenses (a
50/50 block) and the five Frequency Block 6 licenses (a SO/12 block). Although the ten licenses subject to the
designated bidding credit were not de jure set aside for designated bidders, the credit was large enough to create
de facto set-asides.
50 Thus, we will refer to these ten licenses on Blocks 2 and 6 as “effectively set-aside” or
simply “set-aside.”
The FCC also allowed any designated bidder that qualified as a small business to pay for its license over ten
years at an attractive interest rate.
51 The FCC required non-designated bidders to pay 20 percent of their winning
bids within five business days of the auction’s close, and the remaining 80 percent within five business days of
44 Licenses of the same bandwidth that cover the same region should be perfect demand substitutes, with two qualifications. First,
owning incenses with adjacent bandwidths within a particular region may be particularly valuable because a small guard band that prevents
interference between adjacent licenses can be used for transmission by a single owner to increase its effective capacity. Peter C. Cramton,
Money Out of Thin Air, 4 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRAT. 267, 275 (1995). Second, owning licenses in adjacent regions on the same frequency
may allow a company to reduce disruption along the geographic border of the two regions. Id.
45 Some core aspects of the auction form were proposed by auction experts Paul Milgrom and Robert Wilson of Stanford University
and Preston McAfee at the University of Texas. John McMillan, Selling Spectrum Rights, J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES, Summer 1994, at 145,
154. The simultaneous, open ascending bid format allowed bidders to switch among incenses. With sequential auctions, bidders must
predict future prices when determining current bids. Id. at 153-54. The FCC’s choice of the simultaneous, open ascending bid format is an
extraordinary example of reliance on economic theory in the absence of empirical data. And the FCC’s willingness to innovate probably
increased government revenue by millions of dollars. See Cramton, supra note 2, at 35.
46 PAUL MILGROM, AUCTION THEORY FOR PRIVATIZATION (forthcoming 1996) (manuscript at 19, on file with the Stanford Law
Review). To ensure that the auction would end within a reasonable time, the FCC imposed several ancillary rules, including minimum bid
increments and an activity rule, which reduced a bidder’s eligibility to bid in later rounds if it were inactive in early rounds. For details
about the auction rules, see Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act—Competitive Bidding, 9 F.C.C.R. 5532, 5541-53
(1994) (Fifth Report and Order, PP Docket No. 93-253) [hereinafter Fifth Report & Order].
47 Third Report & Order, supra note 20, at 2968.
48 Results of the nationwide narrowband auction are located on the Internet at http: //www.fcc.gov/ pub/ Auctions/ PCS/ Narrowband/
Nationwide/finalbid.txt. Although bidder identities were supposed to be confidential, most designated bidders physically left the auction site
early in the bidding. Because it was relatively easy for big, established bidders to identify each other, the FCC made bidder identities public
for the second auction.
49 Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act—Competitive Bidding Narrowband PCS, 10 F.C.C.R. 175, 201
(1994) (Third Memorandum Opinion and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, PP Docket No. 93-253) [hereinafter Third
Memorandum & Order]. The FCC also expanded the definition of what constitutes female or minority “control.” In the nationwide auction,
50.1 % equity ownership by women or minorities was required, but in the regional auction, women and minorities could create control
groups which owned as little as 25% of equity as long as the group owned more than half of the voting stock. Implementation of Section
309(j) of the Communications Act—Competitive Bidding, 9 F.C.C.R. 5306, 5307 (1994) (Order on Reconsideration, PP Docket No. 93-
253) [hereinafter Order on Reconsideration].
50 MILGROM supra note 46, at 27. A designated bidder willing to pay $100 million for a license could bid as much as $167 million.
51 The installment plan was available to all “small businesses, including small businesses owned by minorities and/or women, on all
regional licenses.” Order on Reconsideration, supra note 49. The FCC announced the small business installment plan prior to the nationwide
auction. See Third Report & Order, supra note 20, at 2978-79. After the nationwide auction, the FCC allowed designated bidders that did
not qualify as small businesses to pay by installments at an interest rate “equal to the rate for ten-year treasury obligations, plus 2.5 percent.”
Order on Reconsideration, supra note 49. In the regional narrowband auction, however, the only serious bidders that qualified as small
businesses were also designated bidders (i.e., Benbow PCS Ventures, Constant Touch Communication, InstaCheck Systems, PCSD, and
Lisa-Gaye Shearing).AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AT THE FCC 1
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the licenses’ award.
52 In contrast, the FCC required a winning small designated bidder to pay 10 percent at the
auction close and only 10 percent more upon the award of the license.
53 The remaining 80 percent would be
financed by the government at the ten-year treasury bill rate of 7.5 percent. The designated bidder would only
owe interest for the first two years and then would make equal quarterly installments for the next eight years to
pay off the remaining interest and principal.
54
Like the bidding credit, this installment program represented a significant bidding subsidy, because
designated bidders could not borrow from private lenders on such favorable terms. The size of the subsidy can be
calculated by discounting the installment payments to present value using a risk-adjusted interest rate. Finance
economists equate the risk-adjusted interest rate with the market rate—in this case, the rate designated bidders
would have to pay private lenders. Since private lenders possibly discriminate against designated bidders,
55 the
rate they are forced to pay in the market may not represent the true risk of nonpayment.
56
Determining the appropriate risk adjustment with any kind of precision is extremely difficult. At most, we
know that the government was extending credit as a secured lender with a 20 percent equity cushion. If a
designated bidder defaulted, the government could easily foreclose and resell the licenses, but their resale value
would be uncertain. Therefore, the government’s primary risk as lender is that the licenses may be worth less than
80 percent of the auction price and that the proceeds of subsequent resale would not repay the government’s loan.
Much of this risk, however, may be diversifiable and therefore does not justify a higher risk premium.
57 In order
to crudely estimate the installment subsidy, we assume that the risk-adjusted market rate for designated bidders
would have been 12 percent—4.5 percentage points higher than the 7.5 percent ten-year treasury rate that the
government actually charged.
58 We chose 12 percent because it approximates the actual cost of secured financing
for two of the narrowband bidders (as well as the cost of funds for broadly similar high technology
organizations).
59
52 The FCC typically awards licenses within three months of the auction’s close. Cramton, supra note 2, at 7.
53 Third Report & Order, supra note 20, at 2978.
54 Order on Reconsideration, supra note 49, at 5307.
55 When considering an installment subsidy for designated bidders, the FCC found that, in passing the Small Business Credit and
Business Opportunity Enhancement Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-366 (1992), Congress . . . recognized that these funding problems are
even more severe for minority and women-owned businesses, who face discrimination in the private lending market. For example, Congress
explicitly found that businesses owned by minorities and women have particular difficulties in obtaining capital and that problems
encountered by minorities in this regard are “extraordinary.” A number of studies also amply support the existence of widespread
discrimination against minorities in lending practices. Fifth Report & Order, supra note 46, at 5573.
56 This suggests that the interest rate subsidy benefits the designated bidders more than it costs the government. This would be true if
lenders demanded a risk premium of 8% even though true nondiversifiable risk would only justify a four-point premium.
57 The Capital Asset Pricing Model suggests that risk premia should only compensate owners for risk that they cannot avoid by
diversification. RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 161-66 (4th ed. 1991).
58 The 10-year treasury note rate itself overstates the risk-free rate: Treasury notes pay interest only at maturity, while the auction
installment plan requires higher repayment levels in earlier years, when a lower risk-free rate would obtain.
59 PageNet, a substantial paging firm, had a bond maturing in 2002 with a yield of 11.75% at the time of the auction. Moody’s
Investor Service, Corporate Bonds (U.S.), MOODY’S BOND RECORD, June 1995, at 81. The largest bidder’s approximate cost of debt was
12%. Telephone Interview with Steve Lerner, Financial Analyst for PCSD.STANFORD LAW REVIEW, 48, 761-815, 1996 12
FIGURE 1: PRESENT VALUE OF INSTALLMENT AND BIDDING
CREDIT SUBSIDIES
60
60 The present value of an installment subsidy for a particular risk-adjusted interest rate was calculated assuming that the government
received 20% of nominal bid immediately, 7.5% of the nominal bid after both the first and second year, and 8.125% of the nominal bid in
each of the remaining eight years. This cash flow was then discounted to present value for particular interest rates using the formula: present
value of year n cash flow = (year n cash flow)/(1 + risk - adjusted interest rate)
n. The present value of all cash flows was then expressed as a
percentage of the nominal bid. The line representing the present value of the installment subsidy and the bidding credit (expressed again as a
percentage of the nominal bid) is simply 40% of the previous calculation.AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AT THE FCC 1
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To illuminate the effect of this assumption on the size of affirmative action subsidies, Figure 1 represents
estimates of the present value of the installment and of bidding credit subsidies for a range of possible risk-
adjusted interest rates. The top line depicts how the installment subsidy alone affects the present value of
designated bidders’ payments, while the lower line depicts the combined effect of the installment subsidy and the
40 percent bidding credit.
61 At a 12 percent risk-adjusted rate, the present value of the installment payments
equals 84.2 percent of the amount financed. This is the proportion of a winning bid that the government would
receive if a designated bidder won any of the twenty regional licenses to which only the installment subsidy
applied (i.e., Frequency Blocks 1, 3, 4, and 5). As for the ten set-aside licenses (Blocks 2 and 6), because of the
combined effect of the installment subsidy and the 40 percent bidding credit, the government only receives
50.5 percent of the winning bids.
62
B. The Impact of Affirmative Action
1. Comparing the nationwide and regional results.
Twenty-eight bidders participated in the regional narrowband auction; by round 12, only the twelve firms
listed in Table 2 remained. Of these twelve, nine won licenses when the auction ended after 105 rounds.
TABLE 2. BIDDERS AFTER ROUND 12 IN REGIONAL NARROWBAND AUCTION
Non-Designated Bidders: Designated Bidders:
Advanced Wireless Messaging (Advanced Wireless) Benbow PCS Ventures, Inc. (Benbow)
AirtTouch Paging (AirTouch) Constant Touch Communications, Inc. (Constant)
Ameritech Mobile Services, Inc. (Ameritech) Insta-Check Systems, Inc. (InstaCheck)
MobilMedia PCS, Inc. (MobileMedia) PCS Development Corporation (PCSD)
PageMart II, Inc. (PageMart) Lisa-Gaye Shearing (Shearing)
Radiofone Nationwide Paging Service (Radiofone)
Westlink Licensee Corporation (Westlink)
Two aspects of the auction outcome (Table 3) stand out: (1) four of the six frequency blocks sold as
nationwide aggregates, and (2) eleven of the thirty licenses were sold to designated bidders. Not only did
designated bidders win all ten of the “effectively set aside” licenses, but InstaCheck prevailed on the Block 5-
South license, even though the 40 percent bidding credit did not apply.
61 The lower line is simply 60% of the upper line.
62 As shown in Figure 1, if the appropriate risk-adjusted interest rate were 18%, the present value of the installment payments would
be 69.4% and the value with both installment and bidding subsidies would be 41.6%.AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AT THE FCC 1
5
TABLE 3. FINAL OUTCOME IN REGIONAL NARROWBAND AUCTION
(All values are net of applicable installment subsidies and bidding credits.)


















1 50/50 <––––PageMart won all regions––––> 92.6 3.67 15.7
2** 50/50 PCS Development* won all regions 76.6 3.03 -4.3
3** 50/12 MobileMedia won all regions 53.7 3.40 13.4
4 50/12 Advanced Wireless won all regions 53.6 3.40 13.3
5 50/12 Air Touch InstaCheck* Ameritech AirTouch AirTouch 49.6 3.14   4.7
6** 50/12 Shearing* Shearing* Shearing* Benbow* Benbow* 44.8 2.84 -5.4
Total    370.9 3.26  6.2
* Designated bidder (Woman/Minority bidder)
** Woman/Minority bidder received a 40% bidding credit on Blocks 2 and 6.
The present value of the government revenue—after taking account both the bidding credits and installment
subsidies—was approximately $371 million. Bidders paid an average of $3.26 per MHz-pop,
64 but as in the
earlier nationwide auction, the 50/50 licenses were worth more per MHz-pop than the 50/12 ones.
65 Not
surprisingly, after taking into account the bidding credit and the installment subsidy, the cost per MHz-pop of
licenses purchased by designated bidders was lower than that of analogous licenses purchased by unsubsidized
bidders.
The regional auction did, however, produce one surprising result: The price per MHz-pop was 6.2 percent
higher than the price paid by bidders in the nationwide auction that occurred just three months earlier. This
increase in the regional narrowband auction represents more than a $21 million increase in government
revenue.
66 PageMart, MobileMedia, and Advanced Wireless paid significantly more for national aggregations
than winners paid for identical licenses in the earlier auction. The increased prices in the regional auction are
surprising because it is difficult to understand why the winners in the regional auction did not bid more when they
participated in the national auction three months earlier.
Indeed, evidence from other auctions suggests that, when similar items are sold in sequence, the later items
usually sell less than the earlier items.
67 This “declining price anomaly” has been observed in auctions for wine,
63 When non-designated bidders prevailed, the “Present Value of Auction Revenue” is simply their winning bids. When designated bidders
prevailed, the figure is their winning bids multiplied by the appropriate discount factor. For all the licenses on Blocks 2 and 6, this discount
factor was 50.5, which reflects the 49.5% installment subsidy and bidding credit. See text accompany note 62 supra. Estimating the present
value of the auction revenue for InstaCheck’s purchase of the Block 5-South license is complicated in two respects. First, because the 40%
bidding credit did not apply to Frequency Block 5, only the 84.2% discount factor (reflecting the installment subsidy alone) was deducted
from InstaCheck’s $8 million final bid. Second, PCSD’s crossover bidding on Block I not only induced PageMart to bid up the price of this
Block 5 license, but later PCSD’s decision to stop bidding on Block I induced PageMart to withdraw a prevailing $10.129 million bid on
this Block 5 license and consequently, as required by the auction rules, to incur a $2.129 million penalty (the difference between its
withdrawn bid and Instacheck’s winning $8 million bid). Accordingly, the present value of the revenues generated for Block 5-South license
was calculated to be: ($8 million x 0.842) + $2.129 million = $8.9 million. See Table 5 infra
All bidding data referred to in this article are available on the Internet either on the World Wide Web (http://www.fcc.gov) or by
accessing fcc.gov by anonymous ftp. Information is organized in text or database formatted files. The data for round 12, for example, is at
ftp://ftp.fcc.gov/pub/Auctions/ PCS/Narrowband/ Regional/Round—012/s3—12.txt.
64 “Dollars per MHz-pop” is calculated by dividing the total revenue ($370.9 million) by both the population (252.6 million) and the
number of megahertz auctioned (0.45). Population as of 4/1/90 from FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, BIDDER’S INFORMATION
PACKAGE FOR THE REGIONAL NARROWBAND PCS AUCTION 3 (1994) (citing BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1993. at 822 (113th ed. 1993)). For a given bandwidth, the “dollars per MHz-pop’
measures how much a bidder is willing to pay per potential customer for a MHz license. For example, since Frequency Block I had a total
width of 0.1 MHz (50 kHz incoming + 50 kHz outgoing = 100 kHz), a $ 3.67 price per MHz-pop suggests that PageMart was wiring to pay
approximately 37 cents per potential customer for 50/50 nationwide coverage.
65 In the nationwide narrowband auction, the 50/50 licenses sold for $3.17 per MHz-pop and the 50/12 licenses sold for $3.00 per
MHz-pop. Nationwide auction data is located at ftp://ftp.fcc.gov/pub/ Auctions/PCS/Narrowband/Nationwide/finalbid . txt.
66 If the nationwide prices per MHz-pop had been realized in the regional auction, the two 50/50 frequency blocks would have each
sold for $80.0 million and the four 50/12 frequency blocks would have sold for $47.3 million—generating $349.3 million, $21.6 million less
than the actual regional revenues shown in Table 3 supra.
67 Orley Ashenfelter, How Auctions Work for Wine and Art, J. ECON. PERSPECTIVE, Summer 1989, at 23, 29-30 (describing the price
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timber, cattle, and satellite licenses.
68 Game theory provides three different reasons why we should have expected
prices in the regional auction to be lower than the earlier national auction: risk-averse bidders, marketing
advantages, and the difficulty of aggregating regional licenses. First, risk-averse bidders prefer the sure gains of
winning today to the uncertain prospects of winning tomorrow. Such bidders, therefore, would be willing to bid
more in the first auction than the expected sale price in the later auction.
69 Second, early resolution of uncertainty
regarding a firm’s spectrum capacity provides a tremendous marketing and development advantage. Being first to
market in an unproven industry with substantial network externalities and significant switching costs has
enormous value.
70 Third, because the later licenses were regional, a firm wanting to create a national paging
system would probably pay a premium to avoid the aggregation difficulties presented by buying five individual
regional licenses on a single frequency block.
71
Based on the above, we would expect prices in the regional auction to be lower than those in the nationwide
auction. What, then, explains the $21 million increase in regional prices? We contend that the rise in prices was
caused by the FCC’s unexpected announcement after the nationwide auction that a substantial increase in the
affirmative action subsidy would apply to subsequent auctions. As discussed above,
72 affirmative action can
create more bidding competition by enhancing both intergroup and intragroup competition, and it can thereby
increase the seller’s expected revenue.
73 The increase in affirmative action is an attractive hypothesis because it
alone is a key variable that changed in the interim between the nationwide and regional auctions.
74
A simple comparison between nationwide and regional prices, however, does not provide very powerful
evidence that affirmative action alone effected the price change, because other factors might have caused the
regional prices to increase. For example, regional prices may have been higher not because of designated bidder
competition, but rather because of the presence of non-designated bidders with regional strategies. Bidders that
only sought regional licenses would not have provided direct bidding pressure in the nationwide auction, but
would have been able to bid up the winning prices in the regional auction.
75 However, since three of the four non-
set-aside regional frequency blocks were sold as nationwide aggregations, it is apparent that many of the non-
designated firms that won in the regional auction could have purchased comparable licenses in the nationwide
auction at lower prices.
76 Indeed, PageMart, MobileMedia, and Advanced Wireless did participate in the
nationwide auction, but dropped out at prices well below those they were willing to pay three months later in the
regional auction.
77 Thus, for regional demand adequately to explain the increased regional prices, it must be that
these firms did not anticipate the higher regional prices.
Another possibility is that bidders paid more in the regional auction because they were capital constrained in
the nationwide auction: Since the nationwide prices exceeded government estimates, it is possible that bidders
failed to bring enough capital to the nationwide auction. Under this theory, prices were higher in the regional
auction simply because bidders amassed larger war chests. This capital constraint hypothesis, however, is
68 R. Preston McAfee & Daniel Vincent, The Declining Price Anomaly, 60 J. ECON. THEORY 191, 192 (1993). There are exceptions
to declining prices: Prices tended to increase in the sequential sale of Israeli cable television licenses. Neil Gandal, Sequential Auctions of
Israeli Cable Television Licenses: An Empirical Test for interdependent Valuations (May 25, 1995) (unpublished manuscript on file with the
Stanford Law Review). Apparently firms were willing to pay more for later licenses because of complementarities. Id.
69 McAfee & Vincent, supra note 68, at 193 (noting that “[f]or a risk averse bidder . . . the randomness of utility from the final
auction reduces his value and therefore increases the bid he is willing to make in the first period”).
70 Fast resolution of spectrum allocation is so important that designated bidders recently petitioned the FCC to eliminate certain
prospective affirmative action subsidies, which were to apply to the second broadband auction, in order to avoid litigation over the
subsidies’ constitutionality. Text of “Affirmative Action Review’ Report to President Clinton Released July 19, 1995, 1995 Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 139, § 11.1.1 (July 20, 1995).
71 See text accompanying notes 112-116 infra (discussing partial aggregation risk at regional auction).
72 See text accompanying notes 30-33 supra.
73 For affirmative action to have caused the price increase, however, its existence or magnitude must have been unanticipated. If the
increased demand for licenses caused by increased affirmative action in the regional narrowband auction had been anticipated, bidders who
sought nationwide aggregates of regional licenses (e.g., PageMart, MobileMedia, and Advanced Wireless) would have bid more aggressively
in the nationwide auction. Some auction participants might have anticipated that the FCC would enhance the affirmative action subsidies in
the subsequent auction after designated bidders exited en masse following the early rounds of the nationwide auction, but we believe that,
even if that were the case, they did not anticipate the extent of the subsidy increase.
74 After considering affirmative action’s effect on revenue, we describe and critique three alternative explanations for the increased
revenue—none of which proves satisfactory. See text accompanying notes 96-111 infra.
75 For an example of how regional demand can enhance bidding competition, see McMillan, supra note 45, at 156 n.10.
76 In the nationwide auction, 50/SO licenses sold for an average of $80 million, and 50/12 licenses cost an average of $47.3 million.
In the regional auction, the non-set-aside 50/50 aggregation sold for $92.6 million, while the non-set-aside 50/12 aggregations sold for an
average of $52.3 million.
77 See Cramton, supra note 44, at 296-317. Tables VIIA-D and VIIIA-G give the national auction bids of PageMart (bidder ID 9683),
Advanced Wireless (alias American Portable, bidder ID 5403), and Mobile Media (bidder ID 1666). PageMart dropped out of the 50/50
bidding at $79.0 million, but paid $92.6 million in the regional auction; Advanced Wireless dropped out of the 50/12 bidding at $45.9
million, but paid $53.6 million in the regional auction; Mobile Media dropped out of the 50/12 bidding at $44 million, but paid $53.7 in the
regional auction.AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AT THE FCC 1
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inconsistent with the bidding behavior of some relatively liquid corporations who dropped out of the national
auction, yet paid more for a national aggregation in the regional auction. In particular, AirTouch—with equity
worth more than $10 billion—had substantial resources at its disposal,
78 and in all likelihood could have bid
more in the nationwide auction, but chose not to.
While neither the regional demand nor the capital constraints theories adequately explain the higher prices in
the regional auction, we still do not wish to base our affirmative action theory on the simple comparison between
the regional and national auctions. Instead, the next section provides direct evidence from an analysis of
designated and non-designated bidding behavior in the regional narrowband auction that affirmative action
increased government revenue.
2. The impact of designated crossover bidding.
A simultaneous auction is somewhat like a game of musical chairs. The auction continues as long as there are
more bidders than items to be auctioned. If three identical goods are being simultaneously auctioned, the price at
which the fourth highest valuer drops out determines the price that the top three valuers will pay. For example,
consider five bidders (A, B. C, D, and E) who have reservation prices of $50, $40, $30, $20, and $10
respectively. If we held an ascending simultaneous auction with $1 bid increments for three identical chairs, we
would expect that bidders A, B. and C would each win a chair for $21. D’s willingness to bid $20 creates excess
demand at prices less than $21. If D were not present at the auction, E would be the fourth highest valuer, and the
three chairs would sell for only $11 each. In this example, then, D’s presence increases the total auction revenues
by $30 (from $33 to $63). Identifying the ‘`marginal excess demand”—i.e., the last bidder to drop out—allows us
to infer how the presence of certain bidders affected price.
79
The bidding data from the regional auction provide strong evidence that designated bidders caused the excess
demand responsible for increasing government revenues by approximately $45 million. By round 12 (of the 105
rounds) when bidders had reached 70 percent of the ultimate price, all of the ultimate non-designated winners
(PageMart, MobileMedia, Advanced Wireless, AirTouch, and Ameritech) held high bids on the licenses that they
would ultimately buy,
80 and virtually all other non-designated bidders had dropped out of the action.
81 Because
the non-designated bidders that were still eligible held high bids for the licenses they desired by round 12, they
had no incentive to raise prices any more.
The dramatic exit of the excess non-DE demand is illustrated in Figure 2. This figure shows the average
excess demand for both 50/50 and 50/12 licenses for different auction prices (expressed as a percent of the final
price). The step function shows how the excess demand by non-designated bidders was gradually extinguished as
prices rose. When the auction prices had reached 20% of their final level, there were two excess non-designated
bidders for each license type in each region. When the prices rose above 30% of the final price, excess demand
by non-designated bidders fell from two to one for each license type (50/50 or 50/12). Most importantly, when
prices rose above 70% of the final prices, there was no excess demand by non-designated bidders for any license.
Figure 2, then, shows that designated bidders were responsible for the last 30% of auction revenue for the simple
reason that none of the remaining non-designated bidders had an incentive to increase prices.
FIGURE 2: EXCESS DEMAND BY NON-DESIGNATED ENTITIES
(REVENUE WEIGHTED)
 82
78 On March 20, 1995, AirTouch’s stock was worth $13.5 billion. See http://www.streetnet.com/airtouch.
79 Milgrom uses a similar analysis to identify the marginal bidders who determined the prices of the first broadband auction.
MILGROM, supra note 46, at 45-46.
80 The one exception to this was AirTouch, a non-designated bidder which held prevailing bids in Frequency Block 5 in the
Northeast, South, and West regions but ultimately won licenses for Frequency Block 5 in the Northeast, Central, and West regions. See note
63 supra. However, as discussed at note 87 infra and accompanying text, shifting demand from the South to the Central regional licenses
would not increase the auction price.
81 The only non-designated bidders that were still active, but would not ultimately purchase a license, were Westlink, which made its
last new bid in round 15, and Radiofone, which made its last new bid in round 44.
82 Figure 2 is derived as follows. First, for each region and type of license (50/50 and 50/12), the highest bids that each non-
designated bidder placed on the license(s) are identified and sorted in decreasing order. For example, consider the Northeast Block I license.
The highest bids by the final two non-designated firms to bid on this 50/50 license were $17.5 million (PageMart) and $12.6 million
(McCaw). From these bids, we conclude that at a price of $12.6 million there is excess demand for one Northeast 50/50 license by a non-
designated bidder. This identifies the top step of the excess demand function.
To aggregate the excess demand curves across license type and region, we state the price dimension as the fraction of the final bid. In
the case of the Block 1 Northeast 50/50 license, the top step then occurs at 12.6/17.5 = 72%. That is, when the price is above 72% of the
final price, there is no excess demand by non-designated bidders. For prices below 72% of the final price, there is non-designated excess
demand of at least one. These individual demand curves are then aggregated in the usual way.
Figure 2 shows the average excess demand where the licenses are weighted by revenue. When only aggregated across regions, but not
across license type (50/50 or 50/12), the excess demand curves are nearly identical to the curve in Figure 2. Excess demand by non-
designated bidders falls to zero (on average) when prices are greater than 70% of the final price. Hence, by this measure, 30% ($70 million)STANFORD LAW REVIEW, 48, 761-815, 1996 18
                                                                                                                                                                                    
of the revenue collected in the auction comes from bidding by designated bidders. This number is bigger than the $45 million number we
determine in Table 4, because here the assumption is that by placing a highest bid of $12.6 million, McCaw is expressing a willingness to
pay $12.6 million, but no more. In Table 4, the alternative assumption applies—that McCaw is willing to bid all the way up to the response
to the $12.6 million that caused McCaw to drop out. In fact, since bids increase in a discontinuous fashion, it is impossible to know how
high McCaw would be willing to go. The only known fact is that McCaw dropped out after placing a final bid of $12.6 million. The actual
increase in revenue caused by the designated firm bidding is probably between the overly conservative figure of $45 million and the overly
optimistic figure of $70 million.AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AT THE FCC 1
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All of the excess demand came from designated bidding. The two frequency blocks effectively set aside for
designated bidders by the 40 percent bidding credit (Blocks 2 and 6) were insufficient to satisfy the demands of
the five designated bidders still in the auction: PCS Development, Shearing, Benbow, InstaCheck, and Constant.
These designated bidders upped the price of the ten set-aside licenses to the point where it became attractive for
them to cross over and bid on the licenses for which only the installment subsidy was available. Specifically, in
round 18 (after Benbow and PCSD had bid up the prices on Frequency Block 2), PCSD crossed over and bid
against PageMart for Frequency Block I licenses.
83 PCSD raised the price on the Block 1 licenses thirteen times
before dropping out. PageMart ultimately won all the Block 1 licenses, but PCSD’s bidding raised the price on
Block 1 licenses by $16.4 million, as shown in Table 4. PCSD could afford to push the bidding on Block 1—
even without the 40 percent bidding credit—because it still would receive the installment subsidy, permitting
payment of only 84 percent of a winning bid. Moreover, the 40 percent bidding credits, which effectively set
aside the Block 2 licenses, allowed PCSD to cross over and bid against PageMart without fear that PageMart
would retaliate by bidding up the price of Block 2 licenses.
84 Our inference that designated crossover bidding
caused the puce increase is particularly strong because designated bidders were the only firms to bid against
PageMart for Block I licenses after round 12.
85
Although Instacheck also bid for Block 1 licenses, we attributed the price increase to PCSD’s crossover
because InstaCheck did not ultimately drop out of the bidding for the non-set-aside licenses. Instead, at various
times in the auction, InstaCheck merely shifted its constant demand for a single license by bidding on a variety of
licenses one at a time.
86 Accordingly, InstaCheck’s crossover bidding did not represent excess demand but merely
shifted demand: Instacheck never reduced its demand for a non-set-aside license as it ultimately purchased a
South license for Frequency Block 5. However, PCSD’s crossover demand for non-set-aside licenses was excess
in the sense that PCSD reduced its demand (to zero) before the auction’s end. As in our earlier example of
musical chairs, it is only excess demand that drives up auction prices.
87 PCSD’s crossover bidding was therefore
crucial in driving up the ultimate sale price of Block 1 licenses because it was the last bidder to reduce its
demand for the non-set-aside licenses.
83 Compare ftp://ftp.fcc.gov/pubs/Auctions/PCS/Narrowband/Regional/Round—01 8/s3—I 8.txt with Round—017/s3—17.txt. The
competition between Benbow and PCSD had increased the combined price of Frequency Block 2 Northeast and South licenses to $49.94
million by round 17, which, even after deducting the 40% bidding credit, was still more than PCSD’s $29.64 million bid on the same two
regional Frequency Block 1 licenses in round 18 (29.64 < (49.94 x 0.6) = 29.97).
84 MILGROM supra note 46, at 33.
85 PCSD raised PageMart 13 times, and Instacheck raised PageMart three times.
86 InstaCheck was active in crossover bidding raises in each of the non-set-aside frequency blocks: three times in Block 1, four times
in Block 3, three times in Block 4, and 10 times in Block 5.
87 In the earlier example, see text accompanying note 79 supra, even though the fourth highest valuer (D) controlled the auction price,
we would expect to observe “shifted” demand from the ultimate winners (A, B. and C). For example, if in the middle of the auction A, B. and
C each held a high bid of $15 on one of the chairs, D might raise the price of Chair I to $16, displacing A’s previous high bid. Instead of
bidding $17 on Chair 1, A might temporarily shift its demand and bid $16 on Chair 2, thereby displacing B’s previous high bid. Likewise B
might shift its demand and bid $16 on Chair 3, displacing C. C might in turn raise the price of any one of the chairs to $17. Shifting demand









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































lSTANFORD LAW REVIEW, 48, 761-815, 1996 22
PCSD’s crossover bidding on Frequency Block 1 also predictably led to price increases for the other non-set-
aside frequencies (Blocks 3, 4, and 5). PageMart, facing unexpected competition from PCSD on Block 1 licenses
(and unable to retaliate by bidding up prices of Frequency Blocks 2 or 6), responded by repeatedly shifting its
demand to Blocks 3, 4, and 5. As shown in Table 4, PageMart shifted its demand from the Frequency Block 1
50/50 licenses to the 50/12 licenses in Frequency Blocks 3, 4, and 5, raising the bid on these latter licenses 61
times and increasing their final price by $28.5 million.
88 PageMart’s shifted demand was the only bidding that
raised the prices of the 50/12 licenses in the last 60 rounds of the auction (all other firms bidding on 50/12
licenses during the last 60 rounds ultimately purchased 50/12 licenses),
89 and PageMart only shifted its demand
to the 50/12 licenses because of PCSD’s crossover bidding on the Frequency Block 1 50/50 licenses.
Table 4 shows that the only excess demand for the last $44.9 million of the auction increases came from
designated bidders. As shown in the column labeled “Number of subsequent raises by non-designated bidders
who ultimately dropped out,” none of the bidding that gave rise to the last $45 million in revenue came from non-
designated bidders who ultimately dropped out. Had affirmative action not created excess designated bidder
demand, the ultimate winners would not have needed to bid above the levels listed in the “Maximum region bids
by non-designated bidders who ultimately dropped out” column.
InstaCheck’s purchase of a non-set-aside license is also strong evidence that designated bidding determined
the final price of the non-set-aside licenses.
90 Once excess demand for the set-aside licenses drove up their prices
to the point where crossover bidding became attractive, the excess designated demand started setting the prices
for both set-aside and non-set-aside licenses. Our theory that excess designated demand determined non-set-aside
license pricing is confirmed by the similarity of the prices paid for the set-aside licenses (net of the 40 percent
bidding credit) and the non-set-aside licenses.
91
The crossover bidding effect on the regional auction can be summarized as follows:
(1) Excess demand by designated bidders for the set-aside frequency blocks (2 and 6) drove PCSD to cross over
and bid up the price of Frequency Block 1.
(2) Crossover bidding by PCSD on Frequency Block 1 caused PageMart to bid up the price of Frequency Blocks 3,
4, and 5.
(3) The auction ended when the bidding on Frequency Block 2 finally extinguished excess designated demand—
allowing PCSD to create a national aggregation of regional licenses on Frequency Block 2 so that it no longer
needed to cross over and bid on Frequency Block 1.
By round 104, the bids were high enough to squelch the excess designated demand and, therefore, the impetus for
crossover bidding—but only after this crossover bidding had increased the government’s revenues by
approximately $45 million—or 12 percent of the government’s total auction revenue. In short, PCSD’s crossover
bidding, and the shifted bidding it inspired, made the government a substantial sum of money.
3. The impact of the set-aside licenses.
The prior section demonstrated how crossover designated bidding on Frequency Blocks 1, 3, 4, and 5
increased auction revenue, but it did not discuss how affirmative action affected the price on the frequency blocks
that were effectively set aside by the 40 percent bidding credit. To analyze these de facto set-asides, we need to
estimate not only the effect of the set-asides on the prices designated bidders ultimately paid for Frequency
Blocks 2 and 6, but also how the reduced supply affected the prices non-designated bidders ultimately paid for
the non-set-aside frequencies.
One might initially suspect that affirmative action would have decreased the auction revenues for the set-aside
licenses because the 40 percent bidding credits effectively precluded non-designated bidder competition. But, in
88 From Table 4, 10.9 + 10.8 + 6.8 = $28.5 million. The “Maximum region bids by lion-Designated Bidders who ultimately dropped
out” was calculated by identifying the ultimate winner’s response to the highest bid from a non-designated bidder who ultimately dropped
out or reduced the number of licenses that it demanded. A license by license breakdown of Table 4 appears in Table 5 infra.
89 As shown in Table 4, designated bidders on two occasions raised the price of non-set-aside 50/12 frequency blocks: Constant once
raised the bidding on a Block 3 licenses (in round 17), and PCSD once raised the bidding on a Block 4 license (in round 28). This crossover
bidding by designated bidders who ultimately reduced their demand shows even more directly how affirmative action raised prices.
90 See Table 3 supra; see also MILGROM, supra note 46, at 30 (“The fact that a minority-owned bidder was able to acquire a license
for which no discount was offered indicates that there was excess demand for the reserved licenses.”). If excess non-designated demand had
been determinative in pricing the non-set-aside licenses, designated bidders would have been able to buy set-aside licenses more cheaply
than non-set-aside licenses.
91 The prices of the set-aside bands net of the 40% bidding credit wee 1.7% higher than those of the non-designated bands and
represented the minimum bid increment by which the non-designated bidders needed to exceed the designated bidders. Net revenue for the
designated band/MHz = (90.9 + 53.2) / (0.1 + 0.0625) = $887/MHz. Net revenue for the non-designated band/MHz = (92.6 + 53.7 + 53.6 +
50.8) / (0.1 + (3 x 0.0625)) = $872/MHz. Comparing the designated and non-designated bands: ($887 - $872) / $872 = 1.7%. The price
setting effect of the excess designated demand does not mean that designated bidders were not weaker bidders. Indeed, the installment
subsidy by itself was substantial, reducing the present value of the designated bidders’ payments to 84% of these net bid.AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AT THE FCC 2
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the absence of affirmative action, allowing the excluded non-designated bidders to compete for the set-aside
licenses would not have increased the winning bids for these licenses. Table 4 shows that the final excess demand
by non-designated firms was extinguished when the bidding for the 50/50 block went above $76.2 million and the
bidding for the 50/12 blocks went beyond $42.8 million. Allowing these excluded non-designated bidders to
compete for the set-aside licenses would not have raised the price of set-aside licenses for the simple reason
that—even after deducting the bidding credit and installment subsidy— the set-aside frequency blocks sold for
more (Block 2 for $76.6 million and Block 6 for $44.8 million) than the excluded non-designated bidders were
willing to pay. On these facts, it does not appear that setting aside Frequency Blocks 2 and 6 reduced their
equilibrium price.
The 40 percent bidding credit acted as a safety net to insure a minimum amount of designated entity
participation, but in the end this safety net was not needed. The designated demand was sufficient to compete
away virtually all of this bidding credit—as the nominal prices on Blocks 2 and 6 were approximately 40 percent
higher than on their non-set-aside counterparts. Indeed, the final auction bids superficially suggest that the
installment subsidy did all the work—meaning that if only the installment credit had been granted, designated
bidders would have still been strong enough to win eleven licenses and would have still pushed the bidding of the
non-designated firms to the same level.
Yet this superficial analysis ignores how the “safety net insurance” of the 40 percent bidding credit may have
induced designated entities (and their passive non-designated partners) to form and prepare for the auction.
Knowing that there were at least 10 licenses effectively set aside may have induced many designated firms to
undertake the fixed costs to organize, investigate, and finance auction participation. Having incurred these fixed
costs, the designated firms created enough demand that they bid away virtually all of the 40 percent bidding
credit, but the bidding credit may have played an important role in encouraging the firms to incur these costs.
92
There is an important lesson here. The government can offer very substantial bidding credits to insure
minimal minority and/or female participation often without increasing the cost of the subsidy.
93 Guaranteeing a
minimum amount of participation may induce stronger designated firms to form so that in the end the government
need not pay off on the guarantee.
94
In sum, the bidding data suggest that the 40 percent bidding credit did not reduce the price of the effectively
set-aside licenses and, if anything, this large credit, by providing a type of insurance, may have induced stronger
designated demand to form. The designated demand was so strong that even after taking account of both the
bidding credit and the installment subsidy, the designated firms paid more for the set-aside blocks than the non-
designated firms were willing to bid. Since affirmative action did not reduce the government’s revenue on the set-
aside licenses, the evidence that crossover DE bidding raised the price of the other licenses by $45 million
therefore constitutes our combined estimate of the revenue-enhancing impact of affirmative action.
95
C. Alternative Hypotheses
Before accepting our $45 million estimate, however, we consider three alternative hypotheses that might
explain the auction’s outcome. Our estimate is based on a crucial assumption that, in the absence of affirmative
action, no bidder would have bid above the final price where the excess non-designated bidders dropped out of
the auction. This assumption, however, might fail for three reasons:
92 We consider whether the 40% bidding credit deterred non-designated firms from bidding at text accompanying noses 110-111
infra.
93 This analysis is extended in Ian Ayres, Narrow Tailoring (March 16, 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Stanford Law
Review).
94 If the designated entities had not formed, the final bids on the non-set-aside block would almost surely have been lower. Although
Table 4 estimated that without crossover bidding the 20 non-set-aside licenses would have sold for $204.6 million—the price where excess
non-designated demand stopped pushing up the bidding—if 50% more licenses were offered to non-designated firms, then the prices on all
the non-set-aside licenses would undoubtedly have been lower. Rather than the 21st highest valuer’s determining license prices, the 31st
highest valuer would have determined the final price.
95 One may be tempted to reduce the revenue increase by the effect the higher revenue has on tax receipts. For example the
Congressional Budget Office routinely applies an offset of 25%, which is the average marginal corporate tax rate. See CONGRESIONAL
BUDGET OFFICE, BUDGET ESTIMATES: CURRENT PRACTICES AND ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES 8-9 (1995). (The 25% offset is specifically
mentioned in Emil M. Sunley & Randall D. Weiss, The Revenue Estimating Process, TAX NOTES, June 10, 1991, at 1302.) This would be
the right thing to do if the larger amounts paid by firms reduced corporate taxes by 25% of the extra revenue. However, according to David
P. Gamble, Vice President of PageNet, “The amount paid to the government does not change our tax position at all.” Telephone Interview
with David P. Gamble, Vice President of PageNet (February 9, 1996). Because of the enormous outlays in building a paging network, the
paging companies rarely, if ever, show a profit that would be taxed. PageNet, the largest and most established paging company in she U.S.
has never paid corporate income tax. Hence, in the paging business the appropriate offset for lost corporate taxes should be much less than
25%.STANFORD LAW REVIEW, 48, 761-815, 1996 24
(1) Non-Designated Bidders Hid in the Grass: The reservation prices of the non-designated bidders
that dropped out may have been higher than their observed highest bidds—so that in the absence
of affirmative action, these non-designated bidders may have forced up the bidding;
(2) Designated Bidders Would Have Bid Anyway: In the absence of affirmative action, the winning
designated bidders may have still bid more than the prices at which the non-designated bidders
dropped out; and
(3) Affirmative Action Chilled Non-Designated Bidder Participation: In the absence of affirmative
action, the reservation prices of the non-designated bidders that did not participate may have been
increased.
If any of these explanations are true, then our estimate of revenue enhancement would be inflated because our
benchmark of what the winning prices would be in the absence of affirmative action would be too low.
Before considering each of these alternative hypotheses, however, it is important to emphasize that our $45
million estimate does not depend on the earlier comparison with the nationwide auction. As suggested above,
even though unexpected regional demand or capital constraints might explain why the regional prices were higher
than the nationwide prices, these theories do not refute the evidence that all the excess demand responsible for
the last $45 million of bidding came from designated bidders. Our benchmark—the price at which non-
designated bidders dropped out of the auction—already takes into account the possibility that these bidders had
unexpected regional demand
96 or were less capital constrained.
97 We now, however, consider three reasons why
our excess demand benchmark may have understated the prices that would have prevailed in the absence of
affirmative action.
1. Hiding in the grass.
Recall that PCSD crossed over to bid on non-set-aside licenses when the set-asides proved insufficient to
satisfy its demand. If PCSD had not provided the excess demand, it is possible that a non-designated bidder
would have stepped in at the lower prices and created excess demand by bidding on more licenses. If this were
true, the excess demand of non-designated bidders would have been greater than we observed in the auction
bidding; one or more of the non-designated bidders would have been “hiding in the grass”—bidding on fewer
licenses than it actually preferred to buy at a given price. If non-designated bidders were hiding in the grass, then
our inference that crossover designated bidding caused the $45 million increase would be incorrect. In the
absence of affirmative action, some of the non-designated bidders may have bid on a greater number of licenses
and driven the prices at least part of the way toward those achieved through crossover bidding.
Hiding in the grass strategies usually assume that rivals have limited capital budgets: Hiding in the grass in
early rounds may let a bidder buy a license more cheaply if its rivals commit too much of their limited budgets to
other licenses and thereby lose the ability to bid as much against the hidden demand when the “snake” surfaces
by bidding in later rounds.
98 For example, consider an auction in which a forthright bidder has a limited budget of
$100 million and early in the auction holds high bids for three licenses at $20 million per license. Under these
assumptions, a snake bidder might delay revealing its interest in one of these licenses—even if its reservation
price is $30 million. By hiding in the grass for a number of rounds, the snake may induce the forthright bidder to
commit more than $70 million in bids on the other two licenses; the snake can then enter the bidding knowing
that it can outbid the incumbent. Hiding in the grass is a rational strategy when a rival faces a firm budget
constraint, and higher bids on one license by the rival necessarily reduce its ability to bid on other licenses.
The FCC designed the auction eligibility rules to discourage hiding in the grass. To maintain eligibility in the
first stage of the auction (which the FCC ended in round 20), each bidder needed to remain “active,” by holding
or raising the prevailing bid, on at least one-third of the bandwidth it ultimately sought to buy.
99 In the second
stage (which the FCC ended in round 73), each bidder needed to remain active on two-thirds of the bandwidth it
ultimately sought to buy.
100 By round 12, nearly all of the excess non-designated bidder eligibility came from
96 Only four non-designated firms, AirTouch, Americtech, Radiofone, and Westlink, showed any regional demand. Our $45 million
estimate already takes into account the pressure that Radiofone and Westlink exerted on the bidding by setting the pre-crossover designated
bidding benchmark at the prevailing prices when these firms dropped out of the bidding. And because the demand of AirTouch and
Ameritech was ultimately satisfied, the regional demand of these bidders was not the excess demand that caused the last $45 million in
bidding.
97 Even if limited capital constrained prices in the nationwide auction, bidders in the regional auction would not have used their
increased liquidity unless necessary. Our previous analysis of regional bidding indicates that prices were not increased by competition
among large, liquid non-designated bidders in the last rounds of the auction; instead, PCSD’s subsidized crossover bidding drove prices up.
98 There is some evidence that GTE employed this strategy in the initial rounds of the broadband auction. See MILGROM supra note
46, at 47.
99 See note 46 supra.
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ultimate license winners.
101 These eligible non-designated bidders represent the only potential sources of
unobserved excess demand.
The observed bidding behavior of these eligible non-designated bidders, however, was not consistent with a
hiding in the grass strategy. A snake holds back in early rounds, intending to increase demand in later rounds. But
no bidder increased its demand for licenses after round 12.
102 To the contrary, as prices rose, bidders reduced
demand.
103 For example, MobileMedia began by demanding three nationwide aggregations, and PageMart
demanded two. After round 1, MobileMedia reduced its demand to two nationwide aggregations, and after round
6, further reduced it to one band. By round 7, PageMart had also cut its demand to a single nationwide
aggregation.
104
That individual nationwide bidders controlled three of the four non-setaside frequency blocks by round 12
makes us particularly confident that hiding in the grass would not have been a rational strategy. As discussed
below,
105 bidders that hold the prevailing bid for a national aggregation are willing to pay a premium in order to
retain the aggregation. Breaking up a bidder’s national aggregation can expose the bidder to significant losses if
it must buy a subset of the regional licenses; thus, any snake that waited until later rounds to show its demand
would confront an opponent whose fear of suffering significant losses would bolster its willingness to compete.
Hiding in the grass appears irrational as it creates more hardened national rivals that need to defend their
aggregations.
106
Not only would it be unprofitable to hide in the grass in hopes of outbidding an entrenched nationwide bidder,
but the strategy would also unlikely provide an advantage against a rival bidding on only a single license. The
strategic rationale for hiding in the grass, that the competitor may commit too much of its budget to another
license, does not apply to single license bidders. Excluding nationwide and single license bidders as potential
targets of a hiding in the grass strategy eliminates virtually all non-designated bidders. While it is impossible to
prove that in the absence of crossover bidding additional non-designated demand would not have surfaced, the
observed bidding behavior, as well as partial aggregation risk, strongly discounts this hypothesis as a plausible
reason to question our excess demand benchmark.
2. The designated bidders would have bid anyway.
Our excess demand benchmark might also fail if designated bidders (or their passive non-designated partners)
still would have raised prices without affirmative action. Our $45 million estimate implicitly assumes that,
without affirmative action, no bidder would have increased the price beyond the point at which the excess non-
designated bidders dropped out. But if the designated bidders or their passive non-designated partners would
have bid up the price even without affirmative action, then all price increases could not be attributed to the
presence of affirmative action.
We think it unlikely that either the designated bidders or their passive partwould have enhanced competition
in the absence of affirmative action. None of the designated bidders or their partners appears to have had the
resources to bid successfully without affirmative action—indeed, none of these firms was a serious contender in
the earlier nationwide auction. The installment payment subsidy was especially important in inducing the
designated bids. Without government financing, designated bidders would have needed five times as much liquid
capital to pay for the licenses.
Even if designated bidders would have been willing to pay the same present value in the absence of
affirmative action, the government revenue would still have been much less—because of the interest rate subsidy
increasing the nominal designated bids and forcing non-designated firms to pay 16 percent more. Table 3
estimated that in present value terms designated entities paid $76.7 and $44.8 million respectively for the set-
aside 50/50 and 50/12 blocks.
107 Even if we made an assumption more unfavorable to our thesis—that in the
101 The only other bidders who remained eligible were Constant, Radiofone, and Westlink. See Table 2 supra.
102 The only exception is PageMart’s bidding for multiple 50/12 licenses, as in rounds 72 and 74. This behavior, however, was not
hiding in the grass: Before round 73, PageMart tested multiple bidders in a single round, which was consistent with its behavior in the
nationwide auction. After round 73, Stage 3’s heightened activity rules required multiple license bidding—PageMart needed to bid on two
50/12 licenses to retain the option of later bidding on a single 50/50 license.
103 The early rounds of the auction were characterized by aggressive, jump bidding to stake out large claims. See MILGROM, supra
note 46, at 32.
104 These reductions in demand are consistent with the behavior of these firms in the nationwide auction, where no bidder increased
demand after the first few rounds of bidding. Even if the crossover designated bidding ultimately outstripped the amounts that possible
snake bidders were willing to pay, snake bidders should have emerged before the bids went above their reservation price, hoping to bid just
as the designated bidders were dropping out. However, these interim increases in non-designated demand never materialized.
105 See notes 112-116 infra and accompanying text.
106 Likewise, national aggregate bidders become more vulnerable to retaliation as the amounts at stake increase, and they therefore are
much more likely to test the waters by revealing their increased demand before they commit to defending their aggregations. The high cost
of partial aggregation suggests that the national aggregate bidders would not have chosen to hide in the grass and risk retaliation.
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absence of affirmative action, there would be sufficient designated demand to buy all six blocks at these prices—
we still find that affirmative action would have increased the auction price by more than $38 million.
108 But given
our strong belief that designated bidders would not have been willing to bid as much (or at all) in the absence of
the 80 percent government financing,
109 we are also confident in rejecting this criticism of our excess demand
benchmark.
3. Affirmative action might have chilled non-designated bidder participation.
Finally, it is possible that affirmative action deterred some non-designated bidders from participating in the
regional auction. Given the effective set-aside of Blocks 2 and 6, some non-designated bidders may have
calculated that it was not worth the fixed costs of preparing for an auction—including the substantial expense of
amassing a war chest to pay quickly for any purchased licenses. This theory would undercut our excess demand
benchmark, because, in the absence of affirmative action, these additional non-designated bidders may have
driven up the prices beyond the amounts at which the participating non-designated bidders dropped out.
This theory seriously qualifies our reliance on the excess demand methodology. However, we note that there
were no conspicuous “no shows’ at the regional auction. All of the nationwide bidders that could legally
purchase additional licenses made substantial up front payments and then actively bid in the regional auction.
110
This is not surprising: The nationwide auction bidders would have incurred most of the fixed costs necessary to
participate in the regional auction. Thus, while we cannot guarantee that without affirmative action other non-
designated bidders would not have entered to provide additional competition, no direct evidence of deterred
participation exists.
111
D. Strategic Perversities: Bidding Above Atomistic Reservation Prices
The preceding analysis assumed that bidders’ reservation prices for particular licenses were independent of
who won other licenses. In this section, we show how simultaneously auctioning multiple licenses might lead
bidders to pay more for a license than they would pay if the license were offered in isolation.
1. Risk of partial aggregation.
In an auction for regional licenses, a bidder that values a national aggregation more than its constituent parts
risks winning a subset of regional licenses. Because the cost of an incomplete aggregation may be greater than its
synergistic reservation price, an auction participant may be willing to place a total bid that exceeds its reservation
price for the aggregation.
This perverse overbidding is analogous to the bidding behavior observed in simple classroom demonstrations
of a “both pay” auction in which the professor offers to auction a prize of $10 to two students. The prize goes to
the student who bids the most, but the game also requires each bidder to pay the amount of her last bid. Requiring
both the winner and the loser to pay often induces each of the students to bid more than $$10—because a bidder
about to lose the auction with a $9 bid would prefer to win with an $11 bid (and thereby lose $1 instead of $9).
112
The crucial feature of this game is that making the loser pay can induce both bidders to bid above their
reservation prices—this is the core aspect of all “war of attrition” or “escalation” games.
113
To see how the risk of partial aggregation induces similar overbidding as a “both pay” game, consider an
“incumbent” bidder that values owning a national aggregation of five licenses at $100 ($20 per license) but
values owning four of the five at only $40 ($10 per license). If it held high bids of $15 on all five ($75 total) and
108 If, in the absence of affirmative action, designated demand pushed up the price that the designated winners were willing to pay
with affirmative action, then the six blocks would have sold for $332.4 million ((76.6 x 2) + (44.8 x 4)) which is $38.5 million less than the
auction with affirmative action produced.
109 See text accompanying notes 59-61.
110 Pagenet could not purchase additional licenses because the FCC prohibits firms from owning more than three licenses.
111 While the text has focused primarily on the possibility that affirmative action might have deterred non-designated bidders from
incurring fixed costs of participation, it is also possible that affirmative action might have deterred non-designated bidders from incurring
nonfixed costs, such as investigating the value of licenses (as much as they would have in the absence of affirmative action). Spending less
on such investigations might then exacerbate the “winner’s curse’ (to the extent that the auction had a common value element, see note 24
supra) and consequently reduce the reservation prices of even those non-designated bidders that participated in the auction. See Cramton,
supra note 44, at 279-82. While reducing the quantity of licenses available would seem to induce less investigation on the margin, the
strategic interaction of bidders is not so straightforward. Game-theorists have shown that reducing the quantity of items being auctioned
may, for a variety of subtle reasons, induce greater bidder investigation. See Cramton, supra note 44, at 24. Because it is difficult to even
“sign” the effect of affirmative action on how much bidders will investigate and because many of the investigations would have already been
incurred in preparation for the nationwide auction, we believe this possibility is of secondary importance.
112 Barry O’Neill, International Escalation and the Dollar Auction, 30 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 33 (1986); Martin Shubik, The
Dollar Auction Came: A Paradox in Noncooperative Behavior and Escalation, 15 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 109 (1971).
113 See, e.g., John G. Riley, Strong Evolutionary Equilibrium and the War of Attrition, 82 J. THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 383, 383-85
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then an “attacker” bid up the price of individual licenses, a rational incumbent would worry mat if it were to lose
one license, it would be stuck paying $60 (at $15 per license) for the other four licenses that it valued at only $40.
To avoid losing the fifth license, the incumbent would be willing to spend up to $120 to win all five licenses.
114
This might mean, for example, that if the bidder thought it could win all five for $23 each, it would prefer
bidding above its reservation price rather than winning four for $15 each.
115
The risk of partial aggregation may induce a firm to bid more than its reservation price, including the
synergistic value, for a national aggregation of licenses. As in the “both pay” auction, the prospect of a negative
payoff leads to higher bidding. The cost of defending their national aggregations may explain why PageMart,
MobileMedia, and Advanced Wireless were willing to pay so much more after PCSD began its crossover
bidding: The PCSD crossover might have surprised them and disrupted PageMart’s national aggregation.
116 Yet
the possibility that partial aggregation exposure induced higher bidding does not undermine our positive thesis.
The bidding pattern shows clearly that PCSD’s crossover bidding started the chain of events that disrupted
PageMart, Multimedia, and Advanced Wireless’ national aggregations. Thus, even under this theory, affirmative
action was a but-for cause of these higher prices (indeed partial aggregation risks enhanced the effect of
designated bidder crossovers).
2. Raising rivals’ costs and predatory strategies.
Not only does the risk of partial aggregation affect incumbents’ bidding behavior, it may also have secondary
effects on other auction participants. Anticipating that aggregate bidders will pay inflated prices to avoid being
stuck with partial aggregations, firms may strategically choose to bid up the price of a rival’s individual license in
order to weaken their rivals’ market positions (e.g., requiring the rival to charge higher use-fees to cover its
interest payments).
While such behavior is theoretically possible, it is probably not rational for a firm to engage in this strategy
because the risk of actually buying one of the rival’s regional licenses, should the rival drop out of the bidding,
likely outweighs any advantage. Additionally, money spent on licenses is sunk and therefore should not affect a
rival’s subsequent pricing decisions.
117 Finally, engaging in this strategy may induce the rival to retaliate,
especially if the initial bidder is itself trying to form a national aggregation.
As an alternative, a bidder may engage in an even more extreme “predatory” strategy. Whereas the goal of
raising rivals’ costs is just to make them pay more for their licenses, predation seeks to stop the rival from
forming a national aggregation. Breaking up a rival’s national aggregation might increase the marginal cost of
providing certain nationwide paging services (and thus satisfy Salop’s marginality requirement). But given
bidders’ aforementioned willingness to defend their national aggregation “turf,’ we doubt that reducing the
number of national competitors from nine to eight would be worth the amount of money needed to outbid an
entrenched firm.
118
Nonetheless, there is some evidence that, in shifting its demand from 50/50 licenses to the 50/12 licenses after
PCSD’s crossover, PageMart targeted MobileMedia and Advanced Wireless’ national aggregations even though
AirTouch’s licenses were then cheaper.
119 While it is possible to interpret these episodes as evidence of either a
“raising rivals’ costs” or a “predatory” strategy, we think it more likely that PageMart was engaged in a
“temporizing” strategy in which PageMart attempted to retain eligibility by remaining active on the 50/12
licenses so that it could later return to bid against PCSD for the Block 1 national aggregation.
120 Thus, PageMart
bid against the national aggregators despite the higher prevailing bids in these markets, because PageMart had
greater confidence that these bidders would defend their national aggregation and ultimately outbid PageMart.
114 If the attacker were bidding only on a particular license, the incumbent might bid up to $60 to retain the license—meaning that it
would pay $60 for four licenses and $60 for the attacked license. However, an attacker will often switch its bidding among the five licenses,
increasing the price of each.
115 If the incumbent miscalculates and later finds that $23 per license is not sufficient to win all five, her predicament deepens.
Having high bids of $23 on four licenses means that the incumbent now stands to lose $52 ($40 - $92), which means she should now be
willing to bid up to a total of $152 to win all five, or more than $30 per license. Just as in the simple “both pay” auction and other “war of
attrition games,” a bidder’s belief that she can win at an intermediate value determines her willingness to continue.
116 See notes 119-121 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of PageMart’s motivation for bidding against MobileMedia and
Advanced Wireless when Frequency Block 5 (50/12) licenses were cheaper.
117 See, e.g., Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive &elusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power over
Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986) (emphasizing that only strategies that raise a rival’s marginal costs are likely to weaken its ability to
compete).
118 The nationwide auction produced 10 nationwide competitors and the regional auction added four more. See Table 3 supra; note
65 supra. The number of nationwide competitors may increase further when the FCC auctions subsequent narrowband blocks.
119 AirTouch also bid against MobileMedia and Advanced Wireless but only when the prevailing bids on Blocks 3 and 4 were
cheaper than AirTouch’s Block 5 bid. Rather than engaging in predation, AirTouch was arbitraging a price difference.
120 This term and this interpretation of PageMart’s strategy were developed by Milgrom. See MILGROM, supra note 46, at 31-34
(describing the Lidding strategy of PageMart).STANFORD LAW REVIEW, 48, 761-815, 1996 28
This provides a nonpredatory explanation for why PageMart might have been willing to bid on Blocks 3 and 4
when AirTouch’s comparable Block 5 licenses were cheaper.
121
Regardless of PageMart’s motivation, it is clear that PageMart’s 50/12 bidding was caused by PCSD’s
crossover. PageMart showed no interest in the 50/ 12 licenses until PCSD repeatedly bid up the price of the
Block 1 (50/50) licenses. Moreover, PCSD’s disruption of the Block 1 licenses both gave PageMart an excuse
for bidding on the 50/12 licenses and made PageMart less susceptible to retaliation from Advanced Wireless and
Mobile Media.
122
3. Reduced retail competition.
Because firms were bidding for the right to provide paging services in competition with other license winners,
auction rules that affected the identity of the ultimate retail competitors, such as affirmative action, also might
have affected how much a firm was willing to bid. Specifically, if affirmative action reduced the expected
competitiveness in the paging services market, then non-designated bidders might have been willing to pay more
to enter the market.
123 If non-designated bidders perceived that their designated competitors would have higher
marginal costs or limited capacity, they might be willing to bid more for a license because they would expect to
earn higher oligopolistic profits in the paging market.
We do not, however, believe that this hypothesis provides a plausible explanation for the narrowband
bidding. In most regions, designated bidders hold only two of seventeen narrowband licenses (and there are
thirteen nationwide non-designated bidder aggregations). Even if the designated bidders were less effective
competitors,
124 the reduction from seventeen to fifteen strong competitors should not substantially affect pricing.
Reduced competition also does not explain why designated bidders and their passive non-designated partners
were willing to pay such substantial sums for licenses, if they expected difficulty succeeding in the subsequent
market-place.
125 We have nonetheless highlighted this possibility to underscore the point that producing more
government revenue is not the same as allocating licenses to the most efficient users.
126
This section has shown how affirmative action in the FCC’s regional narrowband auction increased
government revenues. While game-theorists have long understood as a matter of theory that subsidizing weaker
bidders can enhance a seller’s expected payoff, we have presented the first empirical demonstration that subsidies
can increase revenue.
127 We do not claim that the FCC intended this effect. Nor do we claim that affirmative
action increased revenues in other FCC auctions where designated bidder subsidies were smaller, less
comprehensively designed, or nonexistent. Indeed, designated subsidies might have stimulated bidding
121 Indeed, there is some evidence that at times PageMart might have been trying to win one or more of the 50/12 licenses. For
example, in round 72, PageMart entered jump bids of $14 million in the West region on all three 50/12 frequency blocks (Blocks 3, 4, and
5). PageMart’s message appeared to be that it preferred a 50/12 in the West at $14 million to a 50/50 at nearly $21 million. PageMart was
challenging each of the non-designated 50/12 bidders in the West to top $14 million or leave it to PageMart. See
ftp://ftp.fcc.gov/pub/Auctions/PCS/Narrowband/Regional/Round—072 /s3—72.txt.
122 Retaliation would be harder to accomplish because PageMart was no longer defending a national aggregation of the 50/50
licenses. PageMart’s bidding on Blocks 3 and 4, when Block 5 licenses were cheaper, led to final bids on Blocks 3 and 4 that were $4.1
million higher than the final Block 5 bids. Even if PageMart were not a predator, MobileMedia and Advanced Wireless would have had to
pay at least what Block 5 winners paid because the Block 5 winners (AirTouch, InstaCheck, and Ameritech) switched whenever there was
an arbitrage opportunity. Final bids for Blocks 3 and 4 each totaled approximately $53.6 million, and the final bid for Block 5 was $49.6,
which included the $2.1 million PageMart penalty. See note 63 supra and accompanying text. Thus, even if the instances of PageMart’s
bidding on the more expensive 50/12 licenses were not caused by affirmative action, “predation” would only reduce our $45 million
estimate for the aggregate effect of affirmative action by a few million.
123 At the extreme, if firms expected that without affirmative action, non-designated bidders would win all of the licenses and
compete the price of paging services down to its marginal cost, then firms would only have been willing to bid very little.
124 We are skeptical that designated bidders will prove to be less efficient. First, the “build out” costs of exploiting a narrowband
license are small (approximately $2.5 million) compared with the cost of the licenses. Third Report & Order, supra note 20, at 2969 n.40.
Second, the designated bidders, together with the* partners, have sufficient capital and expertise to bring PCS paging services to market.
125 If there were fewer licenses for sale, however, it would be possible to construct an example in which a designated bidder would be
willing to pay a substantial sum for a license: For example, if the FCC sold only two licenses, setting one aside for a designated bidder, then
a designated bidder that could commit to limiting its capacity might expect to earn supracompetitive profits. The non-designated bidder
would then find it profitable to charge a supracompetitive price and might not find it worthwhile to drive the less efficient designated bidder
from the market. See Judith R. Gelman & Steven C. Salop, Judo Economics: Capacity Limitation and Coupon Competition, 14 BELL J.
ECON. 315 (1983) (outlining strategies for smaller firms to effectively compete with larger firms).
126 Game-theorists analyzing the “success” of the FCC auctions may tend to equate the highest willingness to pay with the most
efficient user. Regulators, however, may worry that the firms that can most easily collude would be willing to bid the most. Also, large
bidders have a strong incentive to reduce demand to keep auction prices low. See Lawrence M. Asubel & Peter C. Cramton, Demand
Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions, (Univ. of Md. Working Paper, 1995). Hence, small bidders (like InstaCheck) may
inefficiently win licenses when the large bidders (like AirTouch) have higher valuations.
127 Controlled experiments have shown similar results. Andrew Schotter & Keith Weigelt, Asymmetric Tournaments, Equal
Opportunity Laws, and Affirmative Action: Some Experimental Results, 107 Q.J. ECON. 511 (1992) (finding that affirmative action may
lead to increased employee effort and employer revenue); see also Allan Corns & Andrew Schotter, Can Affirmative Action be Cost
Effective? An Experimental Examination of Price-Preferences, (N.Y. Univ. Working Paper, 1996).AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AT THE FCC 2
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competition in other FCC auctions. For example, in the initial broadband auction, which did not include any
designated prefferences,
128 competition for several licenses was relatively weak. While a few small bidders
helped drive up prices, subsidized designated bidding might have further increased competition and auction
revenues.
129
III. APPLICATIONS TO GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT AND PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT
FCC auctions are not the only arena in which affirmative action subsidies might enhance competition. This
Part illustrates how an analogous effect could reduce government procurement costs or increase private employer
profits. As we emphasized in our discussion of affirmative action’s effect on auction revenue,
130 affirmative
action is likely to increase competition only if:
(1) absent affirmative action, there would be insufficient bidding competition; and
(2) the decisionmaker is able to estimate the expected difference between the reservation prices of
preferred and nonpreferred bidders.
While these conditions would not apply to most employment and procurement settings, the strength of the FCC
data suggests that affirmative action could enhance competition in a limited set of circumstances.
A. Government Procurement
While our finding that affirmative action enhanced bidding competition in the FCC’s sale of
telecommunication licenses is itself significant, affirmative action may also enhance bidding competition when
the government is a buyer. Inducing bidders to sell goods and services to the government at lower prices could
affect a significant portion of the economy: Procurement by federal, state, and local governments accounts for
“about 10 percent of the GNP or approximately $450 billion per year.
131
There is ample evidence that the current procurement process is not always sufficient to guarantee the
government a good price. Even beyond the hype of anecdotal $450 dollar hammers,
132 relatively few firms bid
for major contracts. For example, Steven Kelman’s detailed case studies of computer procurement found an
average of only 4.2 bidders per contract.
133 Furthermore, procurement officers “often demonstrate a preference
for a familiar product or an incumbent firm. This kind of firm-specific favoritism is well known in procurement
circles and has led to such expressions as, “No one was ever fired for buying from IBM.’’
134 Favoritism for
128 Because of a concern that auctions with set-asides might be delayed by suits challenging the constitutionality of race- and gender-
based preferences, the FCC limited designated preferences to a fixed set of licenses and conducted separate auctions for broadband licenses
with and without designated preferences, Separating the auctions (and thereby “quarantining” the designated licenses), allowed the non-
designated auctions to take place without delay.
As feared, the first broadband auction with designated preferences was stalled in the courts. On March 15, 1995, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia stayed the auction until it could hear the case brought by Telephone Electronics Corporation (“TEC”),
a rural telephone company. TEC claimed that it was unfairly excluded from the auction and questioned the constitutionality of bidder
preferences for women and minorities. See Edmund L. Andrews, Court Stalls FCC Program for Women and Minorities, N.Y.TIMES, Mar.
16, 1995, at A22. On April 18, TEC unexpectedly withdrew its lawsuit in a settlement with the FCC. See Gautan Naik, Firm Plans End to
Challenge of PCS Auction, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 1995, at A3. The auction, which was scheduled to begin in June 1995, was postponed
until early August, and then again when the June 12 Supreme Court decision in Adarand Constr. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995) made it
likely that the race and sex preferences would not survive constitutional challenge. The FCC modified the rules to give all small businesses,
regardless of the race or sex of its owners, the same 25% price preference and attractive payment terms previously available only to women-
or minority-controlled firms. The auction was rescheduled for August 29. However, it was postponed yet again when the D.C. Circuit stayed
the auction in response to a suit filed by Omnipoint, a New York provider that claimed the new rules would allow large companies to
dominate the auction by making it too easy for small companies to serve as fronts for large ones. See Edmund L. Andrews, FCC is Ordered
to Delay an Auction for Wireless Licenses, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1995, at D4. The D.C. Circuit again lifted the stay, and the auction was
rescheduled for December 11. The Sixth Circuit then granted another stay, but the Supreme Court lifted that stay on October 30. FCC v.
Radiofone, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 373 (1995); FCC v. Radiofone, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 283 (Stevens, Circuit Justice 1995). The auction finally began on
December 18, 1995.
129 The bidders McCaw and American Portable were especially important. See Cramton, supra note 2, at 15-24 (describing the
bidding in the broadband auction). Although 62 bidders applied to bid, only 30 followed through with the required upfront payment. Id. at
17. Clearly, a number of potential bidders were unable to participate because of a lack of capital.
130 See notes 19-25, 34-41 supra and accompanying texts.
131 Marshall, Meurer & Richard, supra note 35, at 3 n I (citing STEVEN KELMAN, PROCUREMENT AND PUBLIC MANAGEMENT 2
(1990)).
132 Jerry Mashaw, The Fear of Discretion in Government Procurement, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 511, 511 (1991) (discussing media
distortions in coverage of government procurements).
133 See Marshall, Meurer & Richard, supra note 35, at 8 n.23 (citing KELMAN, supra note 131, at 109-83).
134 Id. at 14 n.49; see also Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, Auction Design and Favoritism, 9 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 9 (1991)
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incumbent firms reduces bidding competition by entrenching the market power of either one or a small number of
firms.
Affirmative action can enhance bidding competition and reduce the government’s cost of procurement in the
same ways that it increased the government’s revenue from selling narrowband licenses. The nonpreferred private
firms competing to sell the government goods and services are likely to bid more aggressively (i.e., offer lower
prices) both because they might have to compete against subsidized bidders and because they might have to
compete for fewer contracts.
While our earlier examples demonstrated the revenue-enhancing effect of affirmative action in multiple-
round, open-bid auctions, affirmative action in single-round, sealed-bid auctions, commonly used in government
procurement, can produce the same results.
135 A private bidder who knows it must compete with a large number
of subsidized bidders may reduce the markup in its sealed bid to increase its chances of winning the contract.
Giving traditionally disadvantaged groups bidding subsidies may be especially effective in destabilizing tacit
collusion for the very reason that bidders from different social networks may have more difficulty coordinating
behavior.
Set-asides may also create lower overall procurement costs because the reduced quantity of contracts
available to nonpreferred firms can induce them to bid more aggressively. For example, if four incumbent
construction firms were bidding to build four different playgrounds, they might be able to coordinate their
bidding (either tacitly or explicitly) to divide the contracts among themselves. Setting aside one of the bidding
contracts for traditionally disadvantaged, nonincumbent firms may enhance intragroup competition, as the four
incumbents must now compete for just three contracts. Any incumbent that believes it may end up empty-handed
is likely to reduce the markup in its sealed bid. While the government may pay more on contracts set aside for
traditionally disadvantaged bidders, reduced costs for non-set-aside contracts can lower overall procurement
costs.
Failing to recognize how affirmative action can be used to enhance procurement competition grossly
overstates the cost of affirmative action subsidies. For example, nonpartisan state legislative analysts estimate the
California Department of General Services spent an additional $9.9 million last year by rejecting low bids from
firms that failed to comply with affirmative action requirements. Unfortunately, these estimates ignore how
affirmative action may have driven down the low bids that were used as the benchmark.
136 Without the enhanced
bidding competition created by affirmative action, these low bids and the low bids on other bidding contracts
may have been substantially higher. While we do not have access to sufficient data to reliably claim that
affirmative action reduced California’s procurement costs, the procompetitive effects of subsidizing weak bidders
(and the evidence from the FCC’s regional narrowband auction itself) suggest that affirmative action is much less
costly than appears from simply comparing the low bids to the winning bids of traditionally disadvantaged firms.
There is even a sense in which affirmative action promotes the “full and open competition” mandated by the
Competition in Contracting Act of 1984.
137 The government procurement process seeks to balance three
competing goals of “equity (fair access to competing bidders), integrity (reduction in opportunities for
corruption) and economy, (obtaining goods or services required at the lowest possible price).”
138 Although the
main thrust of our argument has concerned economy, affirmative action may also increase fairness and integrity.
When affirmative action increases auction competition, it inevitably diminishes firms’ opportunities to bilk the
government. The privilege of participating in a noncompetitive auction could be recharacterized as unfair access
to the public fisc. And affirmative action may promote fairness by redressing past and present instances of either
private or governmental discrimination. To the extent well-organized incumbents are more likely to capture or
corrupt the purchasing process,
139 affirmative action subsidies counteract both possibilities by forcing favored
incumbents to bid closer to their reservation prices.
Moreover, the enhanced bidding competition induced by affirmative action need not reduce efficiency in
government procurement. While selling to higher cost producers decreases productive efficiency (as in the FCC
auctions), creating lower overall prices may increase allocative efficiency by inducing the government to make
more efficient choices about the quantity and mix of its purchases. Absent the bidding competition affirmative
action fosters, the government may face inflated procurement prices which distort its choice of inputs. In
135 See generally Kelman, supra note 131 (describing common procurement methods).
136 Indeed, a strategic bidder who knows that it is not in compliance with state affirmative action requirements might have an
incentive to purposefully enter a low-ball bid to exacerbate the perceived cost of affirmative action.
137 10 U.S.C. § 2304 (1994). The Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 attempted to discourage sole-source procurement partly by
raising the status of procurement by competitive proposals. Mashaw, supra note 132, at 513.
138 Mashaw, supra note 132, at 512.
139 See generally IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 54-100
(1992) (discussing factors conducive to regulatory capture).AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AT THE FCC 3
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efficiency terms, the increase in allocative efficiency may outweigh or at least mitigate the decrease in productive
efficiency caused by selling to disadvantaged firms with higher production costs.
140
Although the preceding analysis suggests that the procurement context satisfies the first precondition (the
revenue-enhancement effect), the government still faces a substantial information problem in calculating the size
of the affirmative action subsidy. Even if the government is confident that disadvantaged contractors are likely to
be weaker bidders, the government would still need to estimate the expected difference in reservation prices to
know how much of a subsidy or set-aside would lower costs. This is not a straightforward calculation, but the
government does makes just this kind of calculation when it subsidizes small businesses. For example, the
Department of Defense sometimes reimburses small bidders for certain bidding costs if it anticipates greater
competition will lower the government’s price.
141 Even if the government does not have the requisite data to
ensure that affirmative action actually decreases procurement costs, the government may have sufficient
information (e.g., data concerning the effects of past bidding) to be confident that affirmative action is less costly
than the direct cost of the subsidy.
B. Private Employment
To explore the limits of our analysis, this section considers whether affirmative action could induce workers
to “bid” more aggressively for their jobs. Although employees do not literally hid for their jobs, their decisions
over how hard to work or what level of pay to accept might be analogized to an auction bid. Workers may
commit to work harder or for less money if they face subsidized competition from preferred job applicants or
have to compete for fewer jobs because some are set aside for a preferred class.
While our goal for the moment is to assess whether as a positive matter private employers would have a profit
motive for engaging in this type of affirmative action, we emphasize that the translation of our theory from firm-
based preferences to individual-based preferences raises two troubling normative problems. First, the premise
that women or minority workers have lower expected productivity is a more invidious stereotype than the FCC’s
assumption concerning designated bidders’ ability to compete. Even if the choice to subsidize disenfranchised
groups were based on the disadvantages to which the individuals had been subjected, this profit motive for
affirmative action lacks the moral coherence of standard diversity theory, which presumes not that traditionally
disadvantaged workers are less productive, but that they bring different life experiences to their jobs, which
synergistically enhance corporate decisionmaking.
142 Second, the goal of extracting additional surplus from white
and/or male workers is more problematic than extracting additional surplus from non-designated firms.
143 Non-
designated bidders have no right to make supracompetitive profits from our nation’s finite radio spectrum, but
workers have a normative claim to some of the surplus from their employment. The problem is that employers
would use affirmative action to extract additional surplus from non preferred workers.
We return to these normative issues in the final section, but even at a positive level, we believe that, in the
labor markets, the two preconditions for affirmative action to enhance competition rarely both obtain. Employers
do not need to resort to affirmative action to extract surplus from white or male employees because competition
among these employees is sufficient to drive the wage to the marginal product. Due to the persistent
unemployment in the United States, the number of job applicants usually far exceeds the number of openings.
Under such conditions, voluntary affirmative action would not be necessary for employers to gain bargaining
power: Affirmative action is most likely to be able to spur additional competition only if there are relatively few
bidders compared to the number of items being auctioned.
140 This enhancement in allocative efficiency would not apply to the government’s sale of FCC licenses unless the government’s
choice of what or how much to sell were influenced by artificially deflated revenues.
The importance of allocative efficiency is at the core of Henry Manne’s justification for legalizing insider trading: If insider trading
drives stock prices more quickly toward their true value, better investment and consumptive choices might follow legalizing its exchange.
HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADEING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966).
141 Jerome S. Gabig & Richard C. Bean, A Primer on Federal Information Systems Acquisitions: Part Two of a Two-Part Article, 17
PUB CONT. L.J. 553, 580-81 (1987) (discussing Department of Defense proposals to subsidize benchmarking costs for small information
systems firms).
142 See, e.g., Taylor Cox, Jr., The Multicultural Organization, 5 ACAD. MGMT. EXEC. 34 (1991) (contending the diversity enhances
decisionmaking, creativity, and marketing to foreign communities); Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in
Legal Academia, 1990 DUKE L.J. 705 (arguing that affirmative action would improve the quality and social value of legal scholarship).
143 In a sense the employer would be using affirmative action to induce a “rat race.” See George Akerlof, The Economics of Caste and
of the Rat Race and Other Woeful Tales, 90 Q.J. ECON. 599, 60305 (1976). The rat race effect results from workers’ increasing their efforts
to distinguish themselves from other coworkers without considering that their extra efforts would inspire others to work harder. The rat race
effect might intensify where workers with higher expected productivity had to work even harder to exceed the subsidized output of workers
with lower expected productivity.
The rat race effect underscores how affirmative action’s possible profit motive will usually reduce social efficiency. While reducing
workers’ market power may lead to more efficient use of labor, see note 140 supra and accompanying text, it is just as likely that
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Nonetheless, we see a small possibility that employers could benefit from using affirmative action to enhance
their bargaining power when, because of private information and/or contracting costs, employers are unable to
extract all of the gains from trade.
144 A recent article by Andrew Schotter and Keith Weigelt experimentally
tested whether affirmative action subsidies could spur employees to work harder.
145 These authors found that
overall effort of their subjects increased when weak “employees” were favored. While there is only indirect
empirical evidence that affirmative action enhances productivity,
146 our enhanced-competition theory may
provide a causal explanation for two of the most important changes during the last decade in entry level hiring for
law teaching—(1) an increase in the perceived amount of affirmative action and (2) an increase in the number of
publications candidates must write before application.
We remain skeptical, however, that employers would subsidize disadvantaged applicants solely to maximize
profits. Even if affirmative action subsidies or set-asides could profitably enhance employers’ bargaining power,
few employers have sufficient information to risk subsidizing workers with lower expected productivity when
profit-maximization is their sole motivation.
147 However, when employers are motivated by other factors to offer
affirmative action subsidies, our overarching conclusion still pertains: Private employment subsidies may not be
nearly as costly as commonly assumed if they enhance the employer’s terms of trade with nonpreferred
employees.
IV. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS
The central thesis of this article has been positive rather than nonnative: Affirmative action can (and in the
FCC auction did) increase government revenues by enhancing bidding competition. But at some level this fact is
insignificant unless it informs normative legal issues. Accordingly, this section addresses the normative relevance
of the revenue-enhancing effect.
A. Public Affirmative Action
An expected increase in government revenue or decrease in government procurement costs is an inadequate
constitutional rationale for race- or gender-conscious subsidies. But, in cases where there are independent
constitutional justifications, the simple fact that affirmative action subsidies may not be as costly as is commonly
thought may help demonstrate that affirmative action is cost-justified.
1. Revenue enhancement is constitutionally insufficient.
After Croson
148 and Adarand,
149 to withstand an equal protection attack, a racial subsidy must be “narrowly
tailored” to further a “compelling government interest.”
150 Reducing the federal government’s budget deficit is
144 Most importantly, employers often receive only a noisy signal about the expected productivity of a particular applicant. The
heterogeneity in expected productivity reduces the competitive pressure that employees with the strongest resumes face from other
applicants with less scintillating resumes. Because applicants may know more about their prospective productivity than employers,
employers cannot simply extract the surplus by tailoring the contractual terms of employment to each employee’s actual abilities. For
example, consider an employer that wishes to promote a small proportion of its entry-level employees based on the employees’ observed
productivity during a long probationary period: If the employees exhibit different expected productivities, then the strongest workers might
be able to shirk without fear that they will be passed over for promotion. Because the employees’ exact capabilities are unknown to the
employer, simply requiring employee-specific minimum output would not allow the employer to extract all of the expected gains from trade.
Instead, the employer might be able to do better by subsidizing some of the weaker applicants in this competition. Faced with this subsidized
competition, the employees with the highest expected productivity may work harder.
145 Schotter & Weigelt, supra note 127. For groups with a severe disadvantage, affirmative action significantly increased effort and
firm profits. Without the affirmative action, the disadvantaged parties tended to supply no effort, since their chance of promotion was so
small. Id.
146 One intriguing study of stock market “events” shows that when the Labor Department announced awards for companies that had
exemplary affirmative action programs, the companies’ stock prices increased. Peter Wright, Stephen P. Ferris, Janine S. Hiller & Mark
Kroll, Competitiveness Through Management of Diversity: Effects on Stock Price Valuation, 38 ACAD. MGMT. J. 272 (1995).
147 We can think of few examples where private employers explicitly subsidize weaker applicants to spur competition, but “second-
sourcing”—where a firm profitably subsidizes a higher cost second-source to enhance its bargaining power with the primary input
supplier—may be analogous. See Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 139, at 134.
148 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989) (requiring that city affirmative action plan satisfy a compelling
governmental interest and be narrowly tailored to remedy the past effects of discrimination).
149 Adarand Constr. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995) (holding that all governmental racial classifications must withstand strict judicial
scrutiny).
150 Id. at 2117. Gender-based subsidies may be more likely to pass constitutional muster because they need not satisfy strict scrutiny.
Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (subjecting gender-based discrimination to intermediate scrutiny). Even
under the relevant “heightened scrutiny,” however, it may be difficult for the government to justify revenue enhancement as a substantial
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unlikely to qualify as a “compelling government purpose” for disparate racial treatment.
151 Even if increasing
government revenue were a constitutionally permissible goal, the means of achieving this goal would not be
“narrowly tailored,” because there is a strong possibility the government could find a racially neutral means of
substantially achieving the same goal. Specifically, if the FCC had simply subsidized small firms,
152 similar
revenue-enhancing effects might have been achieved.
Whether a small-firm subsidy would create more or less revenue than a race/gender subsidy depends in part
on the government’s ability to identify a stable, nonracial class of “weak” bidders. While many critics of
affirmative action have complained that sham corporations have falsely qualified for minority status,
153 the
problem of “sham” corporations might be even more intractable if preferred status were determined simply by a
corporation’s revenue or financial structure. Strong bidders might be able to redefine their corporate structure to
qualify for small business subsidies. Thus, while it is possible that racial and/or gender classifications are the best
means to enhance bidding competition, we think it clear that the current Supreme Court would not accept revenue
enhancement by itself as a sufficient justification for affirmative action set-asides.
2. Did the FCC’s rules enhance minority or female control of the airwaves ?
To underscore our agnosticism about whether the FCC’s affirmative action was consistent with the
Constitution’s equal protection requirement, we digress for a moment to consider whether the FCC’s designated
bidder regulations enhanced minority or female control of the airwaves. The FCC designed the designated bidder
regulations to avoid two problems: (1) unjust enrichment and (2) sham designated bidders. The unjust enrichment
problem was created by bad publicity generated when previous lottery winners quickly resold their licenses for
huge profits.
154 The FCC responded by promulgating detailed unjust enrichment rules aimed at stopping unjust
minority enrichment. These rules restricted designated bidders’ ability to resell or lease licenses in the short term
to non-designated bidders, and required repayment both of the 40 percent bidding credit and the installment
subsidy if the license were resold in the long term.
155 These rules should stop unscrupulous designated bidders
from capitalizing on the affirmative action subsidies. Indeed, because the 40 percent bidding credit did not mean
that designated bidders actually paid 40 percent less than non-designated bidders for comparable licenses, the pay
back rules may discourage even legitimate resale.
156
The FCC also attempted to deter corporations from trying to get designated status by using minority or female
entrepreneurs as fronts, without allowing them any actual control over the corporation. The FCC therefore
required that women or minorities own a majority of the voting stock and at least 25 percent of the total (voting
and nonvoting) equity.
157
The greatest weakness of the FCC’s approach was its failure to limit the amount or terms of designated bidder
leverage. While nonvoting stock could represent no more than 75 percent of total equity, designated bidders were
allowed to borrow unlimited amounts from their passive equity holders. In fact, female or minority entrepreneurs
did not have to pay in any capital in return for their majority control; some designated bidders financed 100
percent of their auction payments with debt and capital contributions from nonvoting shareholders. Moreover,
151 The Court would likely require the government to show that there was no equally effective race-neutral means to achieve the same
result. See Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2118. In Adarand, two justices even wrote that there could be no compelling government purpose for race-
based subsidies. Id. at 2118-19 (Scalia, J. and Thomas, J., concurring separately).
152 Although in the regional narrowband auction the FCC subsidized firms with annual gross revenues of less than $40 million m the
last two years, the subsidies were not as significant as those given to designated bidders. Small firms received no bidding credit, but they
were able to pay in installments at the 10-year treasury note rate. The installment payments applied to all licenses. See Order on
Reconsideration, supra note 49, at 5306-07.
153 See, e.g., Mark I. Pinsky, FCC Takes Trinity TV Station: Religious Broadcaster Illegally Used Minority Status, U.S. Says, SUN-
SENTINEL, Nov. 16, 1995, at 1D, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (“ “[T]he findings establish that TBN and Crouch created
a sham corporation to take advantage of the minority preference’ policies of the FCC.”).
154 See, e.g., Edmund L. Andrews, Airwave Auction Bill Advances, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1993, at D1, D13; Edmund L. Andrews,
Senate Plan to Sell Radio Frequencies, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1992, at D1, D9.
155 Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act—Competitive Bidding, 9 F.C.C.R. 2348, 2394-95 (1994) (Second
Report and Order, PP Docket No. 93-253) [hereinafter Second Report & Order].
156 The extensive crossover bidding and the designated bidder purchase of a non-set-aside license suggest that the effective bidding
credit was 0% (not including the installment benefit).. Thus, making the designated bidders pay back the full 40% actually penalizes
resellers. Although designated bidders presumably take this illiquidity into account when valuing designated licenses, requiring
overpayment of the bidding credit will tend to increase the inefficient holding of designated licenses.
157 Third Memorandum & Order, supra note 49, at 212. In addition, if the designated bidder control group owned less than half of the
total equity, then no single non-designated investor could own more than 25% of the total equity or more than 15% of the voting stock. Id.
The FCC’s rules, however, did not prohibit designated bidders from adopting supermajority voting requirements that might
undermine the effective control of the control group. For example, while a woman owned 85% of Benbow P.C.S. Ventures, Inc., her
dominant ownership share was insufficient to make many major corporate decisions, because any such decision required approval from 86%
of the voting shares. Long Form Application of Benbow P.C.S. Ventures, Inc., FCC Form 401, Exh. VI at 1 (Nov. 23, 1994).STANFORD LAW REVIEW, 48, 761-815, 1996 34
while designated bidders were required to file a “long-form” application to qualify for designated status, they
never had to disclose the amount or terms of debt financing.
The lack of leverage regulation created a strong likelihood of extreme separation of ownership from control.
The FCC did not limit the amount of free cash flow passive financiers could take from the corporation. The
FCC’s regulations thus permitted a leaky bucket—where many of the benefits of affirmative action ultimately
flowed to people who were not members of the disadvantaged group. FCC apologists might respond that capital
markets are sufficiently competitive to protect designated entrepreneurs and that the goal of the program is to let
designated entrepreneurs control part of the telecommunications spectrum. However, the complete lack of
leverage regulation threatens to undermine the more limited goal of giving women and minority entrepreneurs
effective control of the designated firms.
Passive financiers in these ventures must have been sorely tempted to control the bidding strategies when
millions of dollars of their own money were at stake. The FCC regulations failed to specify the amount of control
that passive debtholders and nonvoting stockholders were allowed to exert. Quite possibly, these so-called
passive financiers might have made round-by-round bidding decisions, with the ultimate threat of withholding
financing should the controlling shareholders act otherwise. In other instances, exerting this type of influence has
exposed passive debtholders to various types of control liability.
158
While we cannot assess who controlled the bidding strategies of the prevailing designated bidders in the
regional auction, an analysis of their long-form applications for designated status indicates extreme forms of
leverage. For example, Lisa-Gaye Shearing disclosed that its passive partner financed 100 percent of the more
than $3 million spent for auction prepayments.
159 Moreover, some of the designated bidders seemed to cede
control of the bidding process to their white male financiers.
160 For example, the female controlling shareholder
of Benbow seemed detached during important parts of the bidding, and one of us observed her reading a novel
for several rounds while her white male team decided how to bid.
161
Because the entrepreneurs who own the designated firms did not face the same threats of ouster by proxy
contest or merger as those who run typical corporations, it strains the imagination to think that nonvoting
shareholders and debtholders would extend virtually all of the firm’s working capital without retaining substantial
influence over its most important decisions. Race- and gender-conscious subsidies must do more than merely
enhance government revenues to pass constitutional muster, and we remain agnostic about whether the FCC
subsidies achieved these additional requirements.
3. Affirmative action costs the government less than is commonly assumed.
Notwithstanding the fact that a revenue-enhancing effect is not constitutionally sufficient to justify affirmative
action, our finding that affirmative action can enhance government revenue has normative relevance. The cost of
affirmative action is significant to determining its wisdom as a matter of public policy. Affirmative action may
appear more attractive if it costs the government very little to redress past discrimination. Even if race- and
gender-based subsidies further a compelling government purpose, the amount of affirmative action must turn, at
least in part, on the cost of the subsidy.
162
From this perspective, it is not crucial that the FCC’s affirmative action subsidy actually increased
government revenue—it is only important that the subsidy cost the government less than is commonly assumed.
The government cost of affirmative action is exaggerated if one considers only the shortfall on contracts that go
to minorities. A more accurate view takes account of the ways in which subsidized minority bidders drive
traditional players to surrender more of the gains of trade on the contracts they win. The naive analysis wrongly
assumes as a benchmark that unsubsidized bidders would have bid as aggressively in the absence of competition
from preferred bidders. The naive benchmark also wrongly assumes that minority bidders only compete with
158 See, e.g., A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285, 294 (Minn. 1981) (holding lender vicariously liable to other
creditors because its financial and managerial control over the principal created an agency relationship); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY § 14(o) cmt. a (1957) (security holder may be considered principal of debtor where security holder takes over management of
debtor); Daniel R. Fischel, The Economics of Lender Liability, 99 YALE L.J. 131 (1989).
159 Long Form Application of Page Call, Inc., FCC Form 401 Exh. IV at 5, 7 (Nov. 23, 1994) (on file with the Stanford Law Review).
Benbow similarly disclosed: “Westlink teas advanced funds to Benbow to make the necessary down payments to the Commission.” Long
Form Application of Benbow, P.C.S. Ventures, Inc., supra note 157, at 2.
160 Shearing’s long form states that she “had an oral agreement [with her passive partner, Adelphia] that they would consult with each
other on bidding strategies during the auction and, to the extent Lisa-Gaye Shearing chose not to be present at the auction, she would direct
what bids to place in what markets and an Adelphia employee would act as her agent in placing those bids.” Long Form Application of Page
Call, supra note 159, at 5.
161 While controlling shareholders might rationally delegate many corporate decisions, it seems odd that the controlling shareholder
would delegate how the corporation invests the vast majority of its capital. Benbow’s observed behavior is all the more disheartening if one
of the goals of affirmative action is to create role models for future disadvantaged entrepreneurs.
162 Assessing the cost of affirmative action will also turn on a variety of other factors, including the cost of excluding white males and
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unsubsidized bidders—therefore that competition among minority bidders does not compete away any of the
subsidy. But in the narrowband auction, designated competition was sufficient to do just this—competing away
virtually all of the 40 percent bidding credit. What naively seems like a huge giveaway ended up costing the
government nothing. As our examination of the FCC auction reveals, subsidizing discrete classes of bidders can
increase both inter-and intragroup competition, invalidating both of the naive assumptions.
While we have shown that the affirmative action subsidies increased revenues in comparison to an auction
without any bidder subsidies, some critics might argue that we have not chosen the appropriate benchmark and in
particular that we should use for comparison an auction with the most effective race-and gender-neutral subsidies.
We emphasized above that small business subsidies might have been able to generate more government revenue
than the affirmative action subsidies did.
163 Yet even if giving small business subsidies could have extracted
higher bids from the dominant bidders, our central finding would still hold: Affirmative action subsidies cost
much less than we would have estimated if we merely multiplied the eleven licenses that designated bidders
acquired by the effective 50 percent (or in one case 16 percent) subsidy.
164
This naive method would estimate that affirmative action cost the government $125.6 million. A small
business subsidy may have succeeded in extracting even more from the established bidders, and in comparison
with this benchmark, affirmative action may still have cost the government some revenue. But this shortfall in
revenue would only be a fraction of the naive cost estimate.
Even if the race and gender subsidies had not increased government revenues, the take-home lesson of this
article is that the fiscal cost of affirmative action may be much less than the facial expense of a 50-cents-on-the-
dollar subsidy. In a sense, the legal significance of our finding is captured by the simple idea that “demand curves
slope downward”—meaning the discovery that affirmative action has a lower price should, on the margin, induce
society to demand more of it.
B. Private Affirmative Action May Deserve Higher Scrutiny
Our discovery that affirmative action subsidies can enhance bidding competition does not unambiguously
militate for an increase in all types of affirmative action. The theoretical possibility that employers may adopt
race-conscious hiring or promotion standards solely to make money suggests that private affirmative action may
deserve higher scrutiny than currently given in Title VII litigation.
A bed-rock principle of Title VII is that there is no profitability defense for disparate treatment on the basis of
race or gender.
165 Particularly with regard to disparate racial treatment, the statute explicitly excludes racial
classifications as a possible “bona fide occupational qualification.’’
166 equal protection jurisprudence, which
requires the symmetrical treatment of laws favoring and disfavoring racial minorities,
167 Title VII distinguishes
between race-conscious employment standards that favor minorities and those that disfavor them. Thus, even
though “there is no BFOQ for race’ when disfavoring minorities, the Supreme Court has said that race-conscious
disparate treatment (in the form of an employer’s voluntary affirmative action program that favors minorities)
does not violate Title VII if it is intended to “eliminate a manifest racial imbalance” and does not unduly burden
or absolutely bar the advancement of white employees.
168
Our enhanced-competition theory suggests, however, that employers might engage in affirmative action solely
to extract more surplus from their white and/ or male employees. While the Supreme Court has not yet treated
race-conscious employment practices that favor and disfavor minorities symmetrically, we suspect that the Court
would require symmetric application if it thought that a private employer adopted a voluntary affirmative action
program solely to increase profits. The Supreme Court may therefore require employers to prove more than a
statistical imbalance—that is, to make some showing that they are motivated by more compelling factors than
making money.
169
Yet the need for heightened scrutiny turns in large part on how often private employers would likely
implement voluntary affirmative action solely to make money. In our previous analysis, we sketched how racial
and gender preference might enhance a firm’s profits, but concluded that in practice employers would seldom
163 See note 152 supra and accompanying text.
164 See text accompanying note 62 supra.
165 See City of L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 716-17 (1978) (noting that “Title VII [does not] contain . . . a
cost-justification defense comparable to the affirmative defense available in a price discrimination suit.”).
166 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1994).
167 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994).
168 Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616, 630 (1987) (citing United Steelworkers of America v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979)).
169 Our interim conclusion that Title VII should prohibit affirmative action programs adopted solely to increase an employer’s profits,
however, has broader application: Namely, the more conventional “diversity” justification for affirmative action—improving
decisionmaking by increasing the diversity of decisionmakers—would also violate Tide VII unless the employer could offer a sufficient
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have the information necessary to calculate the appropriate subsidy with any confidence.
170 Accordingly,




In undertaking this study, we set out to estimate how much the bidding subsidies cost our government. Our
first intuition was that allowing firms controlled by women and/or minorities to pay just 50 percent of their
winning bids would lower the government’s auction revenue. Only after analyzing the bidding data through the
lens of game theory did it become clear that the FCC’s affirmative action increased narrowband prices by forcing
nonpreferred firms to bid more aggressively. In a simultaneous auction, the last bidders to drop out determine
final prices—and in the regional narrowband auction the subsidized designated bidders dropped out last, but only
after they drove up final prices by 12 percent or $45 million.
Our results demonstrate how law-and-economics can illuminate otherwise counterintuitive behavior. The
game-theoretic explanation does not come naturally to those unschooled in strategic thinking. Civil rights
advocates have implicitly conceded that affirmative action subsidies burden the public fisc—they argue instead
that the social benefits of remedying past discrimination or of promoting diversity justify the cost of the
government subsidies. Showing that the subsidies cost much less than previously thought—or indeed that the
subsidies may reduce the federal deficit—makes it easier for affirmative action programs to pass cost-benefit
analysis.
Opponents of affirmative action might contend that the effect on the public fisc should not be dispositive. But
for those who believe that there is an appropriate role for affirmative action in remedying past discrimination or
in furthering diversity, then the results of this article will help illuminate the size of the public subsidy.
The United States has a long history of giving away the radio spectrum:
172 From 1927 until 1982, radio
spectrum licenses were assigned by a process known as “comparative hearings” in which the FCC evaluated
competing requests for broadcast licenses. The licenses were simply given away—once applicants had paid their
lawyers significant sums to construct arguments explaining why they would best serve the nebulous “public
interest.” By 1982, the volume of new cellular telephone licenses began to overwhelm the FCC’s ability to
conduct comparative hearings, so Congress authorized the agency to assign the licenses by lotteries, again
without charge. Hundreds of thousands of firms applied for the giveaway—many only with the desire to resell
their lottery winnings for a profit.
173
Congress’ decision to auction licenses went a long way toward ending these blatant giveaways—but even in
an auction, entitlements can be sold on the cheap if there are not enough bidders. The recent FCC auctions
created just this risk. Had large telecommunications companies reaped windfalls by purchasing licenses at prices
substantially below their valuations, the auctions would have continued the trend of giving away the spectrum.
Though requiring disadvantaged firms to pay just 50 percent of their winning bids struck many commentators as
an unjustifiable giveaway,
174 we have shown that besides promoting diverse ownership of the broadcast spectrum,
the FCC’s affirmative action actually prevented an even larger corporate gratuity.
170 See text accompanying notes 143-147 supra.
171 While this article has focused on the impact of affirmative action at the regional narrowband auction, installment payments and
bidding credits for designated bidders have had large effects in other FCC spectrum auctions. For example, in the C-block broadband PCS
auction for designated bidders, prices as of February 25, 1996, were nearly double the prices in the early MTA broadband PCS auction,
where two bands (A and B) were sold to non-designated bidders. The average final price in the early broadband auction was $15.54 per pop;
whereas the average net price in the C-block auction was $27.70 per pop for an identical 30MHz license. See http://www.fcc.gov.
Competition in the first auction was weak compared to that of the set-aside auction, in which small businesses were given a 25% bidding
credit and installment payments similar to those in the regional narrowband auction. The evidence is strong that the earlier auction ended at
prices well below full value because of the lack of competition in many markets. See Cramton, supra note 2, at 31. Judging from the intense
competition in the C-block auction, the FCC may have raised substantially more revenues in the broadband auctions if the auctions for the
A, B. and C blocks were combined into one auction and C-block bidders were given installment payments in the A and B blocks. In any
event, it is clear that the bidding credits and installment payments did not cost the taxpayers a penny. The broadband results illustrate an
important disadvantage of using set-asides. Namely, set-asides do not permit the crossover bidding between designated and non-designated
licenses. As a result revenues may suffer in one market or the other.
172 This history is detailed in MILGROM, supra note 46, at 2, 12-13.
173 Milgrom gives the example of a sham telephone company, i.e. one formed solely for the purpose of filing lottery applications, that
won the right to supply cellular services to Cape Cod and promptly resold its license to Southwestern Bell Telephone Company for $41
million. MILGROM, supra note 46, at 13.
174 See, e.g., Rauch, supra note 8, at 9, 12 (discussing “discriminating for the sake of discriminating” in interactive video and paging
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 APPENDIX
Table 5 shows on a license-by-license basis how we calculated the information in Table 4. The full names of
the relevant bidders appear in Table 2, with the exception of the non-designated bidder, KDM Messaging Co.
(McCaw), which is a wholly owned subsidiary of McCaw Cellular, now owned by AT&T. The information
contained under the heading “Last Non-Designated Bidder Excess Demand” reports the last time an unsuccessful
non-designated bidder entered a bid on a particular license. For example, for the Midwest Region/Block 1
license, McCaw placed the last unsuccessful non-designated bid of $12.6 million in round 6. The next column,
“Response to Final Bids By Non-Designated Bidders Who Ultimately Dropped Out,” simply reports how the
ultimate winners responded to this excess non-designated demand. For example, in response to McCaw’s
Midwest/Block I bid, PageMart bid $16 million. We assume that, without the crossover designated bidding,
prices for the licenses would have risen to this level, because there was demonstrated excess non-designated
demand at lower prices. While it would be tempting to use this response as the benchmark estimate as the price
for which each license would sell, this method ignores the fact that 50/12 licenses within the same region are
close to perfect substitutes (for any bidder not seeking a national aggregation). To calculate a more conservative
estimate of the effect of crossover bidding, we assumed a bidder expressing demand of $12 million on a Block 3
regional license would have been willing to bid as much for the similar regional license on Blocks 4 and 5.
Accordingly, we calculated, for each region, the maximum response on three 50/12 licenses (to the final bids by
non-designated bidders that ultimately dropped out). We used this higher figure as our benchmark for expected
revenue in the absence of affirmative action. For example, we assume that Westlink would have been willing to
replicate its bid of $8.941 million on the West Block 5 license on all of the West 50/12 licenses, and used the
response of $9.4 million as the relevant benchmark for each of the three licenses. The bottom of the table
aggregates the increase in revenue by block—the overall increase of $44.9 million.STANFORD LAW REVIEW, 48, 761-815, 1996 38